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The FCC and the “Pre-Internet” 
JOHN BLEVINS 
Network neutrality has dominated broadband policy debates for the past decade. 
While important, network neutrality overshadows other policy levers that are equally 
important to the goals of better, cheaper, and more open broadband service. This 
lack of perspective has historical precedent—and understanding this history can help 
refocus today’s policy debate. In the 1960s and 1970s, telephone companies 
threatened the growth of the nascent data industry. The FCC responded with a series 
of rulemakings known as the “Computer Inquiries” proceedings. In the literature, 
Computer Inquiries enjoys hallowed status as a key foundation of the Internet’s rise.  
This Article, however, argues that Computer Inquiries is less important than it 
seems. A series of lesser-known FCC proceedings was more important to the 
development of the “pre-Internet”—a term I use to describe the ancestral data 
networks that ultimately evolved into the Internet. When viewed in historical context, 
Computer Inquiries did not create growth, but instead reflected the growth that the 
pre-Internet proceedings had already unleashed. Computer Inquiries, however, 
contributed to the pre-Internet in other ways that the literature overlooks. 
Specifically, it became a crucial source of information that influenced the more 
important pre-Internet proceedings. Understanding how the FCC helped build the 
pre-Internet also provides important lessons for today’s modern policy debates. One 
implication is that today’s open Internet depended not upon “light touch” restraint, 
but upon aggressive regulatory enforcement over many years. It also illustrates how 
the current policy debate focuses too narrowly on network neutrality rules to the 
exclusion of other proceedings and policy levers that can construct a larger 
“habitat” of innovation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Network neutrality dominates broadband policy debates today. While strong 
network neutrality rules are necessary, the debates often overshadow equally 
important issues that are critical to the future of American broadband.  Network 
neutrality rules, for instance, cannot empower cities to build blazing fast fiber 
networks. They cannot secure adequate spectrum for “super Wi-Fi” that enables the 
next generation of wireless innovation. They also do little to address broadband costs, 
which limit adoption and contribute to the “digital divide” that many low-income 
and rural communities experience. In short, network neutrality is important, but it’s 
not the only game in town.  
This disproportionate focus on a single proceeding, however, is not new. A similar 
lack of perspective exists regarding the FCC’s role in the early history of the Internet. 
Specifically, the literature gives too much credit to a single set of FCC rules for 
encouraging the Internet’s growth. As a result, it overlooks several lesser-known 
proceedings and enforcement efforts that contributed more heavily to building the 
“pre-Internet”—a term I use to describe the early data networks that ultimately 
evolved into the Internet. Understanding this history can help refocus today’s policy 
debates. In particular, it can remind us that the FCC possesses a diverse toolkit of 
policy levers—not merely one high-profile set of rules—to achieve its goals of better, 
cheaper, and faster Internet service.  
This history begins in the 1960s when the growth of computer services created 
several regulatory challenges for the FCC. One problem was that fledgling “data” 
services increasingly relied on telephone networks to reach customers.1 At the same 
time, telephone carriers expressed interest in entering new data markets themselves. 
It was unclear how to regulate any of this activity—and history provided little 
guidance. Data services had never been regulated at all, while the FCC had 
extensively regulated telephone networks as common carriers for decades.2 Neither 
approach, however, seemed to fit the new technological realities.  
The FCC looked for answers in a series of regulatory proceedings in the 1960s 
and 1970s collectively known as the Computer Inquiries proceedings. Computer 
Inquiries enjoys hallowed status in the literature as a necessary condition of the 
Internet’s subsequent growth.3 The literature especially celebrates Computer 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and 
Communication Servs. & Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 11 (1966) (notice of inquiry) [hereinafter 
Computer I NOI]; Bernard Strassburg, Competition and Monopoly in the Computer and Data 
Transmission Industries, 13 ANTITRUST BULL., 991, 993 (1968). 
 2. See GERALD W. BROCK, THE SECOND INFORMATION REVOLUTION 139 (2003). 
 3. Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer 
Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 169 (2003) (stating that Computer Inquiries proceedings 
“were a necessary precondition for the success of the Internet”); Kevin Werbach, The Network 
Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1805–06 (2011) (“The modern PC and Internet markets developed 
as a direct result of the FCC’s actions in Computer I.”); see also infra notes 70–73 and 
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Inquiries’ “layered” regulatory approach, which combined elements of both 
regulation and deregulation.4 Under this layered regime, the FCC deregulated the 
new data services “on top.” At the lower layer, however, the FCC continued to 
regulate the physical telephone infrastructure to protect the burgeoning data industry. 
In short, the FCC protected new cars by regulating only the roads. 
Because of its perceived success, the literature often cites Computer Inquiries to 
justify both regulatory and deregulatory policies. For instance, some scholars 
emphasize the deregulatory aspects of Computer Inquiries, noting the wisdom of 
government restraint in dynamic new markets.5 Other scholars, by contrast, celebrate 
Computer Inquiries’ regulatory interventions, which protected the nascent data 
industry from discrimination.6 The shared assumption throughout the literature, 
however, is that Computer Inquiries was important and a key source of growth for 
early computer services. This Article challenges these assumptions.  
The first argument is that Computer Inquiries is receiving credit for developments 
made possible by other contemporary FCC proceedings. During the 1960s and 
1970s, the telephone network was inadequate for newer computer technologies. 
Transmission service was too slow and too expensive. Carriers also imposed 
numerous restrictions that stifled new data services and equipment.7 The FCC 
responded with a diverse range of proceedings and enforcement efforts (collectively 
the “pre-Internet proceedings”) that addressed these concerns.8 The pre-Internet 
proceedings pressured carriers to open their networks and to accommodate new 
competitors. They also created new freedoms for customers to attach devices, to 
interconnect with private networks, and to share and resell communications 
services.9 Collectively, these actions had more tangible effects in the formative era 
of the 1960s and 1970s than Computer Inquiries’ more celebrated regulatory 
decisions, which the FCC did not adopt in final form until 1980.10  
Computer Inquiries, however, was not irrelevant to the rise of the Internet. Indeed, 
a second argument is that Computer Inquiries contributed to the pre-Internet in ways 
the literature overlooks—namely, as an informational source for the pre-Internet 
proceedings. The voluminous comments in Computer Inquiries publicly 
documented—for the first time—the inadequacy of telephone networks and services 
for modern computer services. This dissatisfaction pressured carriers (particularly 
AT&T) to reform their services, and strongly influenced the other pre-Internet 
proceedings that invalidated carrier restrictions and opened the telephone network to 
                                                                                                                 
 
accompanying text (discussing the legacy of Computer Inquiries). 
 4. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 8. See infra Part II.C. 
 9. See infra Part II.C. 
 10. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Second 
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 387 (1980) (final decision) [hereinafter Computer II 
Final Decision]. 
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new uses.11 This Article defends this claim with primary historical documents from 
the FCC archives that have never been identified in the literature.12  
A third argument is that the more famous aspects of Computer Inquiries—its 
celebrated regulations—are less important than they seem. The literature, I argue, 
inverts the relationship of Computer Inquiries and the pre-Internet’s growth. When 
viewed in historical context, Computer Inquiries is an effect of growth rather than a 
cause. In many instances, it merely reflected either pre-existing norms or the legal 
and market reforms that the pre-Internet proceedings had already unleashed.  
A related argument is that this history undermines the modern literature’s use of 
Computer Inquiries to justify certain deregulatory and regulatory policies. 
Deregulatory advocates ignore the often unspoken assumptions that the underlying 
physical network would remain extensively regulated.13 Regulatory advocates, by 
contrast, overinterpret Computer Inquiries’ regulatory interventions. Contrary to its 
legacy in the literature, the final Computer Inquiries order was arguably a 
deregulatory effort to help AT&T expand into competitive markets. Indeed, the 
FCC’s reliance on both “unbundling” and ancillary jurisdiction arguably reduced 
regulation to facilitate AT&T’s expansion.14  
A final contribution is that the pre-Internet’s history provides insights into today’s 
broadband policy debates. First, it contradicts claims that the Internet’s growth 
depended upon a “light touch” deregulatory approach.15 In reality, the Internet’s 
growth relied upon aggressive regulatory intervention, but only at the physical layer 
(which was less competitive). In this respect, the pre-Internet history lends normative 
support for both network neutrality rules in general, and Title II16 reclassification 
approaches specifically. It also reinforces—through new historical examples—the 
arguments of scholars who have recognized the regulatory foundations of the 
Internet’s development.17  
The pre-Internet’s history also teaches us that today’s open Internet depends not 
merely upon a single proceeding, but upon a larger “habitat” of innovation that 
encompasses a diverse set of proceedings and policy levers. Focusing too heavily on 
one aspect of this habitat potentially diverts resources from other valuable initiatives. 
For instance, I argue that the credible threat of new competition was the single most 
important factor in motivating carriers to improve their networks in ways that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See infra Part II.C. 
 12. See, e.g., Motion for Official Notice [of the First Computer Inquiry], Application of 
Microwave Commc’ns, Inc., No. 16509-19 (F.C.C. May 5, 1968); see also infra Part II.C.1 
(discussing additional documents from the FCC archives). 
 13. The concept of background assumptions is similar to James Joll’s historical analysis 
of the “unspoken assumptions” of World War I. JAMES JOLL, 1914: THE UNSPOKEN 
ASSUMPTIONS (1968). See Stuart Lloyd Mathison & Philip M. Walker, Public Policy Issues 
Arising from the Interdependence of Computers and Communication (1968) (unpublished 
master’s thesis) (on file with National Archives, FCC Docket No. 16979); see also infra 
Part III.B.2. 
 14. See infra notes 295 and 324–25 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra note 352 and accompanying text. 
 16. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–231 (2012). 
 17. See infra note 353. 
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benefited innovative data services.18 The analogue today is that enabling municipal 
broadband projects and private projects such as Google Fiber19 is perhaps the most 
effective means to pressure providers to increase speeds, lower costs, and improve 
service.  
Part I provides an overview of Computer Inquiries and summarizes the current 
literature. Part II describes the FCC’s pre-Internet proceedings that created the 
foundation for data services’ growth. Part III argues that the Computer Inquiries 
regulatory decisions themselves are less consequential than the literature recognizes, 
and examines how the historical record complicates traditional narratives 
surrounding these proceedings. Part IV considers the relevance of this history to 
modern policy disputes, particularly broadband access regulation.  
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER INQUIRIES 
This section provides a brief summary of the two major Computer Inquiries 
proceedings known as Computer I20 and Computer II.21 It then summarizes the 
literature’s traditional account of Computer Inquiries and its layered regulatory 
model.22 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 19. A Different Kind of Internet and TV, GOOGLE FIBER, https://fiber.google.com/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/CY35-WR3E]. 
 20. The Computer I proceeding includes the following major actions from Docket No. 
16979: Computer I NOI, supra note 1; Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the 
Interdependence of Computer & Commc’n Servs. & Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 19 (1967) 
(supplemental notice of inquiry); Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the 
Interdependence of Computer & Commc’ns Servs. & Facilities, 17 F.C.C.2d 587 (1969) 
(report and further notice of inquiry) [hereinafter Computer I 1969 Further Notice]; Regulatory 
& Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer & Commc’n Servs. & 
Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) (tentative decision) [hereinafter Computer I Tentative 
Decision]; Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer & 
Commc’n Servs. & Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) (final decision and order) [hereinafter 
Computer I Final Decision]. 
 21. The Computer II proceeding includes the following major actions from Docket No. 
20828: Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations, 61 F.C.C.2d 
103 (1976) (notice of inquiry and proposed rulemaking) [hereinafter Computer II Notice]; 
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Computer Inquiry), 64 
F.C.C.2d 771 (1977) (supplemental notice) [hereinafter Computer II Supp. Notice]; 
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Second Computer 
Inquiry), 72 F.C.C.2d 358 (1979) (tentative decision and further notice) [hereinafter Computer 
II Tentative Decision]; Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10; Amendment of Section 
64.702 of the Comm’n’s Rules & Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), 84 F.C.C.2d 50 
(1980) (memorandum opinion and order) [hereinafter Computer II Reconsideration Order]. 
Materials from these FCC Dockets are filed at the National Archives in College Park, 
Maryland, and are on file with the author. 
 22. This Article focuses on the first and second Computer Inquiries proceedings. The third 
proceeding—known as Computer III—is discussed in Part IV.C, infra. Amendment of 
Sections 64.702 of the Commc’ns Rules & Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 
F.C.C.2d 958 (1986). 
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A. Brief History of Computer Inquiries 
1. Computer I (1966–1971) 
The story of Computer Inquiries begins with the evolution of computers. Early 
computers were massive, expensive mainframes that provided limited processing and 
programming functions. To use these computers, people had to physically travel to 
the computer.23 During this time, the telephone network was largely irrelevant to 
early mainframe computers.  
In the 1960s, several developments caused telephone networks to become a vital 
component of computer services. The most important was the rise of remote access 
services that telephone lines made possible. With remote access, users could access 
and share computers from different locations.24 Further, owners of large mainframe 
units (such as banks and large retail stores) could lease out idle computer capacity to 
other users.25 Remote access also became more widespread because computing costs 
declined steadily in this period, even before Intel introduced its first microprocessor 
in the early 1970s.26  
Collectively, these developments gave rise to a new “data services” industry that 
provided remote access to various business customers. Stockbrokers could quickly 
retrieve price information. Hotels and airlines could use computer technology for 
processing reservations and payroll records.27 While data services initially served 
business clients, contemporary observers realized their potential in the future. For 
instance, J.C.R. Licklater and Robert Taylor offered strikingly prescient predictions 
of how computer networks would evolve to connect people.28 It was an exciting time. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. Revisions to Tariffs FCC Nos. 260 and 267 Relating to Dataspeed 
40R, 62 F.C.C.2d 21, 27–28 (1977) [hereinafter Dataspeed Order] (memorandum opinion and 
order); see also GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724, 726–27 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussing the 
evolution of the computer up to 1973); Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for 
Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1333 (1987) (discussing contemporary computer 
technology). 
 24. John R. Bonica, A Re-Examination of the Computer Inquiry, 7 RUTGERS J. 
COMPUTERS, TECH. & L. 23, 25–26 (1979); Lynn Hopewell, Computer Communications: An 
Introduction and Overview, in COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS 1, 10–16 (1976); Manley 
R. Irwin, Computers and Communications: The Economics of Interdependence, 34 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 360, 360–61 (1969).  
 25. Computer I NOI, supra note 1, at 12; Comments of National Retail Association, in 
ANDREW J. LIPINSKI, DIGESTS OF THE RESPONSES TO THE FCC COMPUTER INQUIRY (1969) 
[hereinafter COMPUTER I DIGESTS]. 
 26. BROCK, supra note 2, at 95. 
 27. Computer I NOI, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
 28. J.C.R. Licklater & Robert W. Taylor, The Computer as a Communications Device, 
SCI. & TECH., Apr. 1968, at 21, 21, reprinted in SYS. RESEARCH CTR., RESEARCH REPORT 61, 
IN MEMORIAM: J.C.R. LICKLIDER 1915–1990, at 21, 21 (1990), available at 
http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/Compaq-DEC/SRC-RR-61.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NF9
-GSG2] (“In a few years, men will be able to communicate more effectively through a machine 
than face to face. That is a rather startling thing to say, but it is our conclusion.”). 
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The brave new world of data services, however, depended completely upon 
telephone networks to link users and computers.29 Early data services used “private 
lines,” which were dedicated point-to-point lines that were not interconnected with 
the public telephone network. Companies would lease a private line, generally from 
the Bell System or Western Union. This line provided dedicated “always on” access 
to remote computers.30 Over time, users began accessing data services through the 
publicly switched telephone network (PSTN)31 through the use of a modem or 
coupling device. Unlike the high-capacity private lines that businesses purchased, 
public “dial-up” services could bring computing to the general public.32 
Telephones and computers developed in two very different regulatory 
environments. The telephone network was a common carrier utility service, regulated 
extensively under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934.33 Computers, by 
contrast, developed in a “self-contained” parallel environment free from such 
regulation.34 As the technologies began converging, it raised difficult regulatory 
questions.35 To address these questions, the FCC opened a proceeding called “the 
Computer Inquiry” in 1966.36 It would later be known as Computer I. 
Computer I’s initial notice of inquiry requested information on nearly a dozen 
different topics. In time, its focus narrowed to four primary issues: (1) the costs and 
adequacy of common carrier networks for new data services; (2) whether common 
carriers should be allowed to provide data services; (3) whether data providers should 
be allowed to offer communications services; and (4) the privacy of data.37 The 
response was overwhelming. Thousands of pages of comments were filed by carriers, 
data services providers, business customers, and state and federal regulators. The 
comments were so voluminous that the FCC hired the Stanford Research Institute 
(SRI) to analyze and summarize them in a series of reports published in 1969.38  
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. Bernard Strassburg, The Computer Utility—Some Regulatory Implications, 9 
JURIMETRICS J. 19, 19–20 (1968). 
 30. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 19–20 (2d Cir. 1978) (overviewing private 
lines versus toll lines). 
 31. PSTN stands for the publicly switched telephone network. 
 32. See Strassburg, supra note 1, at 996–97. 
 33. 47 U.S.C. §§ 201–231 (2012); see JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, 
DIGITAL CROSSROADS 17 (2d ed. 2013) (“Congress designed Title II of the Act to govern 
wireline ‘common carriers’—that is, to the companies that provided telephone service 
indiscriminately to the public at large.”). 
 34. BROCK, supra note 2, at 139; Paul J. Berman, Computer or Communications? 
Allocation of Functions and the Role of the Federal Communications Commission, 27 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 161, 167 (1974) (noting that “computer services were easily excluded from FCC 
regulatory jurisdiction”); Manley R. Irwin, Computers and Communications: Public Policy at 
the Crossroads, 1 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 35, 35 (1970) (noting that, originally, 
“computer and communications services operated in separate, distinct worlds”). 
 35. Strassburg, supra note 1, at 991–92. 
 36. Computer I NOI, supra note 1. 
 37. Donald A. Dunn, Policy Issues Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and 
Communications Services, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 369, 371 (1969).  
 38. Id. at 369–70. Dunn’s article is an “abstract” of the longer set of reports he helped 
organize as a member of the SRI. Id. at 369. 
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The final Computer I orders focused most heavily on the potential entry of 
common carriers into the unregulated data services market.39 One of the authors of 
the SRI reports claimed this issue was “[e]asily the most controversial.”40 The fear 
was that common carriers would possess unfair advantages in the new data markets.41 
The FCC’s focus on common carrier entry, however, can be deceptive. Computer 
I largely ignored the first question about the costs and adequacy of the carriers’ 
networks and services.42 These issues, however, were equally important (if not more 
important) at the time. As the 1969 SRI summaries illustrate, commenters felt that 
existing networks stifled data services—and not necessarily because of 
discrimination. The comments consistently critiqued carriers’ sluggish technologies 
and restrictive tariffs (that is, terms of service).43 They focused on costs, transmission 
speeds, bandwidth offerings, error rates, and restrictions on line sharing and 
equipment attachments. Today’s literature on Computer I, however, has little to say 
about these important discussions. 
The reason is that the FCC decided to address these issues in other proceedings. 
In its 1970 Computer I Tentative Decision, the FCC acknowledged “the adequacy of 
present tariff offerings of common carriers, and particularly the question of 
interconnection, was the subject of considerable comment.”44 It explained, though, 
that it would address these practices “through rate, tariff and licensing proceedings 
that are now pending or that may be initiated in the future.”45 In this respect, the 
original comments to Computer I reflected a much more diverse set of concerns than 
the final Computer I orders themselves. One explanation, then, for why the modern 
literature overlooks these issues is because the FCC addressed them in different 
proceedings—namely, in the pre-Internet proceedings discussed in the next Part.  
Having excluded these questions, the FCC’s final Computer I order in 1971 
adopted three important measures. First, it distinguished “communications” services 
from “data” services. Communications services would remain subject to Title II 
common carrier regulation. Data services would remain unregulated, though the FCC 
claimed to have authority to regulate them in the future if necessary.46 In other words, 
telephone networks remained regulated, while the computer services that used them 
would remain unregulated. 
Second, the FCC created a third “hybrid” category for services that included 
elements of both “communications” and “data.” The proper regulatory classification 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. In general, both decisions devote the most time to addressing the concerns of common 
carriers entering data markets. See Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 268–69; 
Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 20, at 298–304.  
 40. Dunn, supra note 37, at 383. 
 41. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 269–70; Computer I Tentative Decision, 
supra note 20, at 299.  
 42. Dunn, supra note 37, at 371–76 (“Perhaps the most critical issue presented by the 
computer inquiry is whether or not the telephone carriers are going to be capable of meeting 
the rapidly growing demand for low-cost data communications.”).  
 43. See generally COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25. 
 44. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 20, at 292. 
 45. Id. at 294; see also Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 283–84. 
 46. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 268; Computer I Tentative Decision, 
supra note 20, at 297–98. 
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for hybrid services depended on whether the service’s “primary” use was data or 
communications.47 Hybrid services would therefore require individualized, 
case-by-case analysis.48 If the service was primarily communications, it would be 
regulated. If it was primarily data, it would not be. 
Third, the FCC decided (controversially) that common carriers could enter the 
unregulated data services market. As a safeguard, it required certain carriers to create 
a distinct “data” subsidiary that used entirely different equipment, revenues, and even 
directors and officers. This rule became known as “maximum separation.”49 Its 
rationale was to prevent discrimination and especially cross-subsidization. Potential 
data competitors feared that carriers could charge artificially low prices in the data 
market by shifting costs to their regulated monopoly services, which could then be 
recovered from captive ratepayers.50 
The maximum separation requirement, however, had important limits. For one, the 
rules applied only to carriers with revenues over one million dollars. Many carriers 
were thus exempted from the requirements altogether.51 Even this requirement, 
however, had little practical effect on the world’s largest carrier—AT&T and the Bell 
System. Since 1956, AT&T operated under a Department of Justice consent decree, 
which prohibited the company from providing anything other than communications 
services.52 In short, AT&T was already prohibited from entering data markets. The 
Justice Department’s restriction was critical for the early data market given that the 
Bell System had a nationwide presence and was—by orders of magnitude—the 
largest carrier in the country.53  
2. Computer II (1976–1981) 
Computer technology evolved in the 1970s, and Computer I’s regulatory 
definitions quickly became anachronistic. With the invention of the microprocessor 
in 1971, computers got smaller, smarter, and cheaper.54 As a result, computing power 
became more decentralized and distributed. Computer I’s definitions, however, 
assumed a world of centralized computing processing distinct from the 
communications lines that linked to it. Modern computer terminals could now 
                                                                                                                 
 
 47. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 277–81; Computer I Tentative Decision, 
supra note 20, at 304–06. 
 48. Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 276 (“[W]e are prepared to render ad 
hoc evaluations with respect to ‘hybrid services.’”). 
 49. Id. at 269–71; Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 20, at 302–04. 
 50. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 20, at 299; Cannon, supra note 3, at 178–81 
(“[S]trict safeguards were put into place in order to restrain the market power of the 
communications company and for the benefit of the data processing market.”). 
 51. See Computer I Final Decision, supra note 20, at 274–75; Computer I Tentative 
Decision, supra note 20, at 302–03. 
 52. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956), 1956 
WL 99775 [hereinafter 1956 Consent Decree]; BROCK, supra note 2, at 116–20. 
 53. See Strassburg, supra note 1, at 993.  
 54. See BROCK, supra note 2, at 140; Cannon, supra note 3, at 181–82; Comment, 
Interdependence of Communications and Data Processing: An Alternative Proposal for the 
Second Computer Inquiry, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 307, 313–14 (1978). 
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perform both communications and data functions, which put pressure on Computer 
I’s mutually exclusive regulatory definitions.55 Carriers also adopted new computer 
technologies to improve their own communications services, and wanted assurance 
that these new practices would not violate current regulations. Accordingly, in 1976, 
the FCC initiated a new proceeding that became known as Computer II.56  
The FCC’s ultimate Computer II decision evolved considerably through time. 
Initially, it proposed replacing Computer I’s definitions with three new categories: 
basic voice, basic non-voice, and enhanced non-voice.57 As for terminal equipment 
(known as customer premises equipment or CPE), the FCC proposed regulating 
equipment that performed “basic media conversion” functions.58 If these definitions 
seem difficult to understand, contemporary observers thought so too. The FCC later 
sheepishly acknowledged that “[w]ithout exception, every element of the definitional 
structure . . . was subject to criticism by one party or another” and was “uniformly 
criticized.”59  
The FCC tried to simplify matters in its final Computer II order in 1980. For 
purposes here, the order had three important parts. First, it adopted a more simplified 
set of definitions. It redefined network services as either “basic” or “enhanced.” 
Basic services would be regulated, while enhanced services would not. Basic 
services provided pure transmission of information, and included traditional voice 
service. Enhanced services were, in practice, everything else. They included “any 
offering . . . which is more than a basic transmission service.”60 The FCC deregulated 
all enhanced services, but noted that they remained subject to its residual Title I61 
ancillary jurisdiction.62 In short, the FCC deregulated the cars, but continued 
regulating the roads. 
Second, the FCC allowed common carriers—over objections—to provide 
deregulated enhanced services. It took several steps, however, to prevent unfair 
competitive advantages. First, the FCC required the nation’s two largest carriers 
(AT&T and GTE) to sell enhanced services through a fully separate “resale” entity. 
For similar reasons, the FCC required all facility-owning carriers to isolate (or 
“unbundle”) their basic service and offer it on a nondiscriminatory tariffed basis to 
“all enhanced service providers under the same terms and conditions.”63 Most data 
services providers were not carriers, and thus needed nondiscriminatory access to the 
physical telephone infrastructure.64 In short, carriers could enter the new markets, but 
were subject to restrictions. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. Computer II Supp. Notice, supra note 21, at 772–73 (“The original Computer Inquiry 
did not address the question of data processing elements being removed from the central 
computer and distributed . . . .”). 
 56. Computer II Notice, 61 F.C.C.2d 103 (1976). 
 57. Computer II Tentative Decision, 72 F.C.C.2d 358, 390–91 (1979). 
 58. Id. at 391, 412. 
 59. Computer II Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 410, 424–25 (1980).  
 60. Id. at 417–21. 
 61. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–162 (2012). 
 62. Computer II Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 435 (1980). 
 63. Id. at 474. 
 64. See id. at 466–75. 
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Third, the FCC fully deregulated CPE.65 Carriers could no longer provide 
equipment through tariffs. By removing CPE from carriers’ list of regulated services, 
carriers could not cross-subsidize it with local monopoly revenues. The FCC also 
required AT&T and GTE to sell CPE through the separate resale entity described 
above.66 On reconsideration, the FCC ultimately waived the separate entity 
requirements for GTE, leaving them applicable only to AT&T.67 At first glance, 
Computer II seems to impose strong restrictions on AT&T. However, as argued more 
fully in Part III, the real goal of Computer II was to reduce regulation to help AT&T 
expand into new data and equipment markets.68  
B. The Legacy of Computer Inquiries 
When the FCC released Computer II, FCC Commissioner Tyrone Brown claimed 
the decision “is probably the most important the [FCC] will issue in my time here.”69 
The literature on Computer Inquiries echoes these views. Specifically, it assumes 
that Computer Inquiries was a landmark proceeding that helped fuel the Internet’s 
rise.70 Robert Cannon characterizes it as a “necessary precursor[] to the success of 
the Internet.”71 More recently, Kevin Werbach writes that the “modern PC and 
Internet markets developed as a direct result of the FCC’s actions in Computer I.”72 
William Friedman notes that the FCC’s “Computer Inquiries are widely recognized 
as having allowed the marriage of computers with phones to flourish with one key 
development being . . . the Internet Service Provider.”73 
                                                                                                                 
 
 65. See id. at 438–39, 447. 
 66. See id. at 472–74. 
 67. Computer II Reconsideration Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 72–73 (1980).  
 68. See infra Part III.B.2.b. 
 69. Computer II Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 517 (1980) (separate statement of 
Commissioner Brown). 
 70. BROCK, supra note 2, at 184 (Computer Inquiries provided “institutional foundation 
for the Internet as an unregulated communications system”); Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the 
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Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1259 (2007) (“The Internet is perhaps 
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Internet Access Order – What Now?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 317, 321 
(2007) (“The FCC’s policy decision in the Computer Inquiry proceedings . . . helped give rise 
to the unregulated growth of the Internet.”). 
 71. Cannon, supra note 3, at 204. 
 72. Werbach, supra note 3, at 1806. 
 73. William J. Friedman, Preface, 10 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 187, 188 (2002); see 
also Catherine J. K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: The 
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The literature attributes Computer Inquiries’ success to its “layered” regulatory 
model. Robert Cannon, whose seminal article on Computer Inquiries remains the 
most comprehensive, was one of the first to articulate this view.74 The basic 
principle—one that predates Cannon75—is that communications networks exist in 
layers that possess distinct economic and technological aspects. For instance, the 
Internet relies upon physical layer functionality for actual transmission, and upon 
higher layer functionality for applications and content. In short, roads are different 
than cars—and regulation should reflect this reality. 
Cannon argues persuasively that Computer Inquiries was ahead of its time 
because it reflected these technological and economic distinctions.76 The lower-layer 
transmission services (the “roads”) were uncompetitive natural monopolies. The 
FCC therefore correctly regulated physical transmission as a “basic” common carrier 
service. The higher-layer data services, by contrast, possessed much different 
economic characteristics. At this layer, barriers to entry are much lower because data 
and equipment markets lack the combination of high fixed costs and low marginal 
costs that characterize utility-type networks.77 The FCC’s nonregulation of data 
services recognized these distinctions as well. In short, the FCC was correct to 
regulate “the bottom” while deregulating “the top.” 
The literature acknowledges that the combination of both deregulation and 
regulation contributed to Computer Inquiries’ success. Some scholars, however, 
emphasize the benefits of the deregulatory aspects of Computer Inquiries. One 
example is Jason Oxman’s influential 1999 FCC working paper The FCC and the 
Unregulation of the Internet.78 He writes that the “practical effect of the [FCC’s] 
decision not to regulate data processing services has been nothing short of 
explosive.”79 The decision not to regulate emerging data services is “[p]erhaps the 
[FCC’s] most important contribution to the success of the Internet.”80 Jonathan 
Weinberg notes that Computer II’s nonregulation of enhanced services was “wildly 
                                                                                                                 
 
Role of the Federal Trade Commission Act’s Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net 
Neutrality Debate, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 653 (2009) (“These regulations stemming 
from the Computer Inquiries, along with other FCC decisions, led to a proliferation of 
independent ISPs . . . .”). 
 74. Cannon, supra note 3, at 169, 194–98; see also Kevin Werbach, Breaking the Ice: 
Rethinking Telecommunications Law for the Digital Age, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
59, 84 (2005) (arguing that Computer II was “FCC’s first foray into layered policy-making”); 
Richard S. Whitt, A Horizontal Leap Forward: Formulating a New Communications Public 
Policy Framework Based on the Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 587, 600–09 
(2004). 
 75. INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE, NETWORK WORKING GRP. REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 
NO, 1122, REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNET HOSTS -- COMMUNICATION LAYERS 93 (R. Braden ed., 
1989), available at http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc1122 [https://perma.cc/5D5D-RT7Z].  
 76. Cannon, supra note 3, at 169, 194–98.  
 77. See Richard S. Whitt, Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances to Foster 
Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 432–36 (2009). 
 78. Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the Internet 3, 11 (Office of Plans 
and Policy, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Working Paper No. 31, 1999), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf [https://perma.cc/D842-9W5V]. 
 79. Id. at 11. 
 80. Id. at 24. 
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successful in spurring innovation and competition in the enhanced-services 
market.”81  
Other scholars emphasize the benefits of the regulatory side of Computer 
Inquiries. One early example is Steve Bickerstaff, who argues that modern computer 
services are “a result of government regulatory constraints, not a free market.”82 
Computer Inquiries is part of this story in that it “established a regulatory framework 
conducive to the innovative and explosive growth” of the Internet. He also credits 
Computer Inquiries with keeping AT&T and the Bell system from establishing a 
“nationwide computer services network.” As a result, Internet services—and perhaps 
the Internet itself—“are indirect by-products of the FCC’s decision in Computer I.”83 
Kevin Werbach strikes a similar tone, writing that “[t]he celebrated success story of 
Internet ‘unregulation’ is therefore really about effective regulation.”84 
A related theme in the literature is the relationship between Computer Inquiries 
and AT&T. Some claim that the FCC’s desire to limit AT&T motivated the 
Computer Inquiries decisions.85 For instance, former Commissioner Glen Robinson 
describes the proceedings as a “bold and innovative attempt” to address the problem 
of AT&T’s monopoly.86 Other authors note that the FCC’s mutually exclusive 
definitions of “data” and “communications” effectively quarantined AT&T from 
entering the data market under the 1956 consent decree.87  
The literature views Computer II’s unbundling and structural separation 
requirements as especially important limits on AT&T and other incumbent carriers.88 
These measures ensured that enhanced service providers would obtain 
nondiscriminatory access to the underlying physical network.89 Susan Crawford 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. Weinberg, supra note 70, at 222; see also Tierney, supra note 70, at 321(“The FCC’s 
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 82. Bickerstaff, supra note 70, at 61.  
 83. Id. at 45, 55–56. 
 84. Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer Commission, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1, 14 (2005); 
see also Cannon, supra note 3, at 180 (noting that Computer I was “not a history of regulatory 
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893–94 (2009). 
 86. Glen O. Robinson, The New Video Competition: Dances with Regulators, 97 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1016, 1036 (1997). 
 87. Cannon, supra note 3, at 179; Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical 
Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation 
in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 129 (2003) (stating that the Computer I 
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1804–05. 
 88. BROCK, supra note 2, at 214. 
 89. Werbach, supra note 84, at 24. Werbach noted later that the structural separation 
proved “problematic.” Id. 
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writes that unbundling was the “essential move in Computer II” by requiring carriers 
to sell “their basic transport services separately and without discrimination.”90 This 
separation “was maintained in order to protect new computerized businesses.”91 
James Speta characterizes Computer II’s unbundling requirements as a type of 
successful interconnection regime.92 Unbundling also benefited the CPE market. 
Joseph Farrell and Philip Weiser write that Computer II’s “open access rules, which 
facilitated competition in customer premises equipment, were the most successful 
and enduring.”93  
The common assumption throughout this diverse literature is that the FCC’s 
decisions were important. In particular, the literature assumes that Computer 
Inquiries was a key source of growth for the data services and networks that 
ultimately evolved into the modern Internet. The remainder of the Article challenges 
this assumption. My specific point of departure is that other proceedings—the 
pre-Internet proceedings—are far more responsible for these successes than 
Computer Inquiries. 
II. BUILDING THE PRE-INTERNET: TARIFF BATTLES IN THE 1960S AND 1970S 
This section explains how the FCC helped build the “pre-Internet.” In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the FCC initiated a series of tariff proceedings and rulemakings that 
forced changes to carriers’ services and eliminated restrictions that stifled data 
services. In doing so, these proceedings—which today’s literature often 
overlooks—provided a key foundation for data networks’ growth and innovation. 
This section also makes the novel observation that Computer Inquiries played an 
important role in influencing the pre-Internet proceedings—not because of its 
regulatory definitions—but as a source of information. 
A. Carrier Networks as Obstacles for Data Services 
In the 1960s, data providers and customers argued that telephone networks posed 
obstacles to new data services. Some critiques raised fears of outright blocking.94 
Those critiques, however, were less common than concerns about the costs and 
adequacy of the traditional network for new data services. Though today’s literature 
often overlooks them, these latter critiques featured prominently in the original 
comments filed in Computer I and the contemporary literature.95  
                                                                                                                 
 
 90. Crawford, supra note 85, at 893. 
 91. Id. at 894. 
 92. James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 225, 265–66 (2002). 
 93. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 87, at 130. 
 94. For instance, the dispute between Bunker-Ramo and Western Union is an example of 
the “modern” concern of blocking competitive services outright. Kevin Werbach notes that 
this “incident, now forgotten, anticipated the network neutrality fight by forty years.” 
Werbach, supra note 3, at 1801. 
 95. For Computer I comments, see, e.g., Response of Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass’n, 
Computer I, No. 16979 (F.C.C. Dec. 13, 1966) (“[W]e have experienced . . . unwarranted 
restrictions and outmoded regulations on the availability and use of communications channels. 
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At the time Computer I began, communications services cost too much.96 As 
noted earlier, data services required private lines to connect customers to computers. 
Because they faced little to no competition, AT&T and other carriers artificially 
overpriced these private lines to subsidize cheap local service. Manley Irwin, 
arguably the first legal scholar to recognize these issues, wrote in 1967 that 
“communication costs are becoming a greater proportion of total operating cost” for 
data services.97 Bunker-Ramo (which provided electronic display equipment and 
services) wrote that “smaller users cannot now afford the huge economic burden of 
leasing their own private lines.”98 These costs, it added, were “an inhibiting factor to 
the widespread use of computer services.”99 
High costs also impacted data services that relied on publicly switched lines 
(dial-up services). One particular problem was carriers’ usage-based pricing 
structures, which imposed unnecessary costs on data providers. For instance, in the 
mid-1960s, carriers used time-based pricing—the longer the call, the more you paid. 
These charges, however, had a three-minute minimum charge even if you only spoke 
for one minute or even one second.100 Such minimum charges were inappropriate for 
“bursty” data transmissions that might require only a few seconds (e.g., retrieving 
stock information; retrieving a case from a legal research service).101 
Private-line owners faced similar problems with overbroad pricing structures. 
Unlike users of the public network, private-line owners were charged flat rates for 
full time twenty-four-hour use of the network. Many data customers, however, did 
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1299, 1314 (1967). 
 98. Comments of Bunker-Ramo Corp., Computer I, No. 16979, quoted in Motion for 
Official Notice of Expressions of Need for MCI’s New Concept of Microwave Serv. 
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 99. Id. 
 100. Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 226. 
 101. Some of the parties who specifically critiqued the minimum time pricing in Computer 
I included Bunker-Ramo, the Business Equipment Manufacturers Association (BEMA), 
Electronic Industries Association, Univac, Xerox, and Collins Radio. Computer I Digests, 
supra note 25. 
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not use their leased channels all day.102 Some needed access for a few hours a day 
when markets were open, while others wanted to access computers at night for tasks 
such as payroll processing. 
A separate critique focused on the carriers’ services themselves. The carriers’ 
bandwidth offerings (i.e., the capacity available for data transfers) were often 
incompatible with data services’ needs.103 In terms of bandwidth, data customers 
confronted a feast-or-famine dilemma when leasing private lines. The most basic 
channel was appropriate for low-capacity voice calls, but lacked sufficient capacity 
for many data uses. The next highest bandwidth offering, however, was much larger 
(and thus more expensive) than necessary.104 Data services therefore needed 
intermediate bandwidth channels to avoid needless costs.  
These limited bandwidth offerings also impaired the equipment market. 
Manufacturers intentionally made certain devices less efficient in order to be 
compatible with low-speed voice lines.105 For instance, the equipment manufacturer 
Rixon stated, “We feel that . . . channels with bandwidths approximating two or three 
present day voice channels should be made available for data use.”106  
The technology of the telephone network itself also posed challenges to data 
services.107 Indeed, commenters frequently criticized carriers’ networks for not 
keeping pace technologically with the demands of new data services.108 Carriers had 
designed the telephone system to transport analog voices.109 It was therefore not 
engineered to prevent errors in the transmission of digital information.110 Indeed, 
parties frequently complained about error rates and channel reliability in the 
Computer I proceedings.111 Collectively, these high costs and inadequacies 
threatened future growth. 
B. Tariff Restrictions as Obstacles to Data Services 
The restrictions that carriers imposed on users were an even greater frustration. 
Through its tariffs, the carriers prohibited practices that could have reduced, if not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 102. See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17, 20–21 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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eliminated, many of the problems described above.112 Tariffs were essentially the 
telephone company’s contract with the public. Before offering any regulated service, 
carriers had to file a tariff with regulators that listed its services and prices.113 The 
tariffs, however, imposed various restrictions, such as the prohibition of using a 
residential line for business purposes. The FCC had broad authority under the 
Communications Act to reject tariff offerings that were not just and reasonable or 
were discriminatory.114 Commenting parties urged the FCC to exercise this authority 
to prohibit these restrictions.115 Specifically, parties criticized carriers’ limits on: (1) 
foreign attachments, (2) interconnection, (3) line sharing, and (4) resale.  
1. Foreign Attachments (CPE) 
Today, we just assume we can plug any type of telephone into the wall without 
permission. That freedom, however, did not exist in the mid-1960s. Carriers 
prevented customers from attaching their own equipment to the telephone network 
unless they used carrier-provided interface equipment.116 Similarly to a modern cable 
company, this tariff restriction required users to lease a modem from the carrier to 
connect computers and other data equipment.117 These equipment restrictions applied 
only to the public telephone network. Carriers generally allowed private-line users 
to attach their own equipment—a practice that contradicted the carriers’ professed 
concerns that customer equipment threatened the larger network.118 
These equipment restrictions stifled data services in several respects. First, carrier 
modems were more expensive than comparable third-party modems.119 Even worse, 
they did not work as well. Unlike independent modems, carrier modems were 
standardized general-purpose devices that could not support more specialized uses. 
As a result, these modems imposed artificial limits on the transmission capacities 
available to users.120 The tariff restrictions also distorted equipment markets by 
preventing customers from choosing the devices most suited to their needs. In doing 
so, they stifled innovation and diversification, particularly for lower-cost models that 
could be used on the public telephone network. 
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The comments in Computer I reflected widespread dissatisfaction with these 
restrictions.121 The Business Equipment Manufacturers Association (BEMA) 
asserted that carrier modems increased cost and discouraged product innovation.122 
Federal parties, including the Army and the General Services Administration (GSA), 
called for greater flexibility in equipment choices.123 Various other business users, 
such as Eastern Airlines and the National Association of Manufacturers, urged the 
FCC to eliminate the prohibition on foreign attachments altogether.124  
2. Interconnection 
Tariffs also imposed restrictions on interconnection. These restrictions were 
closely related to the foreign attachment restrictions—and the term “interconnection” 
was often used for both. Technically, however, this restriction prevented users from 
connecting their own private communications networks (e.g., private microwave 
systems) with the telephone network.125 Unlike foreign attachment prohibitions, 
interconnection restrictions applied to both private lines and the public network.126 
The practical importance was that interconnection could potentially lower costs by 
reducing the need for leased private lines. Today, it would be somewhat similar to 
preventing a company from attaching its private intranet service to the public 
Internet. 
Interconnection restrictions also inhibited competition in the carrier market. New 
specialized carriers sought to provide advanced transmission services that were more 
tailored to businesses’ specific demands. To do so, however, the companies needed 
to interconnect with local access networks (which were prohibitively expensive to 
build).127 For instance, carriers such as MCI focused on constructing higher-volume 
intercity lines, but still needed AT&T’s local facilities as the final link to 
customers.128 In other words, specialized carriers were building new interstate 
highways but still needed to connect to other people’s driveways to reach the house. 
Interconnection restrictions prevented them from doing so.  
Commenters in Computer I widely criticized these restrictions. The Department 
of Justice explicitly accused AT&T of using interconnection restrictions to prevent 
new competitive carriers from entering the market. It wrote that “interconnection 
restrictions affect computer-based services [by preventing] the emergence of 
specialized carriers, such as MCI, which would provide data processors with 
low-cost channels [and] specialized services.”129 MCI, unsurprisingly, also called for 
interconnection rights.130 The Data Communications Association argued that the 
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“nature and extent of interconnection of data transmission equipment” would have a 
“substantial impact” on the other Computer I issues.131 Other equipment 
manufacturers such as Xerox raised similar objections.132 Indeed, the FCC itself 
noted that interconnection was one of the most commonly raised criticisms in the 
comments.133 
3. Line Sharing and Resale 
A third restriction prevented users from sharing leased private lines. As explained 
above, private lines offered twenty-four-hour “always on” connections between two 
fixed points.134 These lines, however, often went underutilized both in terms of time 
and bandwidth.135 If parties could share a line (e.g., two banks could share a line that 
connected to a computer in a different city), it would not only lower costs, but would 
also reduce wasted capacity as well. In short, sharing would make data services 
cheaper and more efficient. 
Sharing could potentially work in two ways.136 First, users could collectively 
purchase a line and use it at the same time. Under this arrangement, the parties could 
use specialized equipment (such as multiplexers) to subdivide high-capacity lines 
into multiple independent subchannels. In this respect, equipment restrictions limited 
potential line sharing arrangements as well. Alternatively, customers could “time 
share”—or purchase a single line and use it at different times. For instance, one party 
might use the line to access computer processing during normal business hours, while 
another might use it overnight while its employees were not working.  
Resale services were closely related to line sharing. A resale provider might lease 
a high-capacity private line and then subdivide the various channels to sell to third 
parties.137 In short, they could buy a wide road and create multiple lanes for different 
types of traffic. Under existing tariffs, however, these companies would be illegally 
“reselling” their transmission services to third parties. Carriers also enforced resale 
restrictions through “authorized user” provisions, which essentially limited the 
number of parties who could use the private line.138  
Line sharing and resale restrictions stunted the emerging data services industry. 
The Department of Justice alleged that these restrictions limited the growth of remote 
access services that customers could share.139 Interestingly, contemporary observers 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. Comments of Data Communications Association at 1–2, Computer I, No. 16979, 
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 132. Comments of Xerox, in COMPUTER I DIGESTS, supra note 25. 
 133. Computer I Tentative Decision, supra note 20, at 292. The FCC’s use of the term 
apparently included equipment attachments as well. 
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 137. Comment, Resale and Sharing of Private Line Communications Services: A.T.&T. 
Restriction and FCC Regulation, 61 VA. L. REv. 679, 679–80 (1975). 
 138. Mathison & Walker, supra note 13, at 178–79. 
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cited the ARPANet (The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network)—the first 
direct ancestor of the modern Internet—to illustrate the types of remote access 
service that line sharing and resale could potentially enable.140  
Resale restrictions also limited innovation. With the freedom to share and resell, 
new innovative carriers could emerge that offered integrated bundles of data and 
communications services.141 For instance, a new company might purchase 
transmission from AT&T and combine it with a specialized data service. To the user, 
the transmission and data service would merge into one indistinguishable service. 
Such services would not only be cheaper, but companies could tailor them to the 
individual technological and business needs of customers.142 
Given the growing costs of transmission service, commenters in Computer I 
consistently critiqued the carriers’ restrictions on line sharing and resale. Indeed, 
virtually every noncarrier party who objected to tariff restrictions complained about 
the resale and line-sharing provisions.143 Several parties also sought permission to 
use multiplexing equipment to enable sharing to bring down costs.144 
In sum, in the mid-1960s, carriers’ networks posed significant obstacles to the 
growth of data services—particularly remote access services. The network was 
technologically inadequate and too expensive. Carriers exacerbated these problems 
by preventing users from taking steps to lower costs and improve the technology. By 
the late 1970s, however, the telephone networks had opened themselves to growth. 
Indeed, many parties would later acknowledge that carriers had removed most of 
these unfavorable conditions and that the data industry was thriving. These 
improvements resulted not from Computer Inquiries, but from the pre-Internet 
proceedings described below. 
C. Tariff Reforms and the Growth of Data Services 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the FCC opened a series of proceedings that laid the 
foundation for the explosive growth of computer networks. Rather than listing them 
chronologically, this section groups them thematically into proceedings that (1) 
liberalized entry for specialized common carriers, (2) authorized equipment 
attachment and interconnection, and (3) created line sharing and resale rights. In all 
of these proceedings, Computer Inquiries played an important role as a source of 
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information that influenced the FCC and the carriers. The literature, however, has 
largely overlooked this informational aspect of Computer Inquiries.145  
In fact, Computer Inquiries influenced tariff reform even prior to these 
proceedings. The mere act of opening Computer I in 1966 created immediate 
pressure for reforms by publicizing dissatisfaction with carrier networks.146 IBM 
noted in 1970 that “since this inquiry began, communications-served data processing 
has benefited from actions by the [FCC] and the carriers leading to liberalization of 
tariff restrictions[.]”147 AT&T, for instance, reduced its minimum time charge from 
three minutes to one minute.148 Carriers also began allowing increased sharing on 
both voice-grade and high-capacity lines.149 More concrete reforms, however, would 
soon follow. 
1. Entry—The Rise of MCI 
For much of the twentieth century, the FCC sanctioned the Bell monopoly to 
preserve cheap local phone service. The Bell System offered local service at 
below-cost rates and compensated by overcharging for private and long-distance 
lines.150 It also engaged in “rate averaging,” which means that Bell averaged the costs 
of serving high-cost areas and lower-cost areas denser areas. Accordingly, telephone 
rates were artificially high in urban areas and artificially low in rural areas.151  
Beginning in the late 1950s, microwave technology slashed the costs of 
constructing transmission networks. Private microwave networks thus became an 
attractive substitute for overpriced private lines.152 Microwave systems, however, 
used wireless frequencies, and the FCC required permission to install them. Over 
AT&T’s strong objections, the FCC approved these private systems in 1959.153 That 
landmark decision—known as the Above 890 decision—changed the game. Almost 
overnight, AT&T responded by overhauling its private-line services. Specifically, it 
lowered the costs and allowed more sharing—at least for larger customers with the 
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1330 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 91:1309 
 
resources to build their own microwave networks.154 Smaller users, however, 
continued to pay inflated prices.155  
Above 890 was the first crack in the Bell monopoly. Data services, however, were 
not yet a major concern.156 Instead, the larger importance of Above 890 is that it 
illustrated the benefits of competitive entry. The threat of new microwave systems 
prompted AT&T to improve its services in ways that ultimately benefited future data 
services. Above 890 also rejected the carriers’ arguments that competition would 
harm the overall network. AT&T argued that new private systems would deprive it 
of private-line revenues along its most profitable routes. This deprivation would 
ultimately result in higher overall prices—an argument the FCC rejected.157 In later 
proceedings, parties used the Above 890 decision rhetorically to defeat carriers’ 
rate-averaging arguments.158  
For data services, the rise of MCI was even more important. In 1969, the FCC 
authorized MCI to provide private-line service between St. Louis and Chicago.159 
AT&T and other carriers had vigorously opposed MCI’s application (originally filed 
in 1963), and the proceeding dragged on unnecessarily for years before the FCC 
finally approved it.160 The approval had enormous consequences. MCI was now a 
full-blown competitor to mighty Bell. Everyone recognized that MCI would not stop 
with a single intercity route. Indeed, the entry of MCI triggered a chain of events that 
ultimately led to the breakup of AT&T. 
MCI’s history is often told.161 Most tellings, however, overlook how MCI used 
the needs of the emerging data industry to support its arguments. Interestingly, MCI 
critiqued AT&T’s inflexible tariffs in remarkably similar language. Referring to the 
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coming “Computer Revolution,” MCI explained that new computer customers need 
“high quality interconnection channels with no restriction as to their use and at low 
prices.”162 In a clear swipe at AT&T’s unpopular tariffs, MCI wrote that its 
permissible uses were “limited only by man’s imagination.”163 It promised to allow 
interconnection, line sharing, and more appropriate bandwidth offerings. Its filings 
explained that it “has no restrictive tariffs,” and that “[w]hat a subscriber does with 
the channel . . . does not affect the rate that MCI charges.”164 It also noted that 
carriers’ “existing rigid offerings have voided many attempts to sell . . . data 
transmission systems.”165 In short, MCI sought to be the “un-carrier.” 
MCI stressed data services even more heavily as the proceeding went on. In 1968, 
it filed a “motion for official notice” of the FCC’s Computer I inquiry and its 
comments.166 To my knowledge, the literature has never identified this document, 
but it illustrates the influence of Computer I on MCI’s ultimate approval. MCI 
claimed that the “two proceedings are so interrelated that the [FCC’s] determination 
of the MCI case will be materially aided by official notice of comments in the 
Inquiry.” The document cited many of the complaints from Computer I as evidence 
of the need for new competitive carriers. In particular, it noted the “inability of the 
present-day communications network to serve the emerging computer industry.” 
Data services needed a “large variety of bandwidths (currently unavailable) for 
customer-directed uses . . . unhampered by restrictive tariff provisions.” It also 
quoted the Department of Justice’s concern that users “who needed non-standard 
bandwidth must buy the next larger size, which may be an order of magnitude greater 
than his requirements.”167  
MCI was not alone in citing information from Computer I. The FCC’s Common 
Carrier Bureau (in supporting MCI’s Computer Inquiries notice) explained that 
“[c]omputer interests almost unanimously urged substantial change in common 
carriers’ tariffs relating to foreign attachments and interconnection. They also called 
for shorter minimum rate periods, wider variety of bandwidth offerings, and changes 
in resale provisions.”168 
These arguments influenced the FCC’s ultimate decision approving MCI’s entry. 
In its initial decision, the FCC examiner cited the inflexibility of AT&T’s existing 
tariffs as a reason to approve new competition.169 MCI’s pledge to offer “half-time 
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use and party sharing” would be “of interest especially to computer companies.”170 
The FCC’s final approval also emphasized the flexibility that MCI offered in 
comparison to AT&T. It explained that “MCI imposes fewer restrictions on the 
nature of subscribers’ terminal equipment and on the use of its channels.”171 This 
flexibility could be used for “high speed or lower speed data transmissions.”172 Prices 
were important, but “flexibility”—particularly “the sharing and the part-time 
features”—were also “significant factors” the FCC should consider.173 
The MCI proceeding led AT&T to reform its services in ways that would benefit 
future data services. For instance, in approving MCI’s application, the FCC observed 
that AT&T had recently revised its tariff to allow for “joint user arrangement[s]” on 
certain private lines.174 AT&T’s new service would also “accommodate a 
combination of wideband data and voice grade arrangements.”175 As in Above 890, 
the threat of competitive entry led to an immediate response.  
2. Entry—Specialized Common Carriers 
The FCC’s approval of MCI opened the floodgates for competition. Following 
the decision, the FCC received dozens of applications from new specialized common 
carriers (SCCs) for nearly 2000 new microwave stations.176 Rather than dealing with 
each application individually, the FCC in 1971 adopted general rules that liberalized 
entry for specialized common carriers—once again over the fierce objections of 
existing carriers. AT&T would no longer have the private-line market to itself. This 
1971 decision—the SCC Order—is another important landmark in the growth of data 
services.177 The rich variety of private-line and data services of the late 1970s and 
1980s traces directly back to this decision. 
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Once again, the needs of data services drove the action. In their applications, 
several parties cited the carriers’ restrictions on data services in support of liberalized 
entry policies. For instance, Hallmark wrote that SCCs would focus on “undeveloped 
yet badly needed communications channels [for] computer data transmission.”178 
Greyhound wrote that “existing common carrier services are not adequate to meet 
existing consumer needs.”179 The data equipment manufacturer Dacom complained 
that customers faced “an intricate maze of restrictions and prohibitions.”180 It added 
that “the rate of growth of digital transmission” has been “adversely affected by 
characteristics and problems associated with the limited communications systems 
and services preferred by present common carriers.”181 
Interestingly, Computer I once again played a prominent informational role. The 
Department of Justice wrote that the Computer Inquiry had revealed a “solid 
consensus” that current rates and services were not “adequate” for computer users.182 
Southern Pacific Communications, an aspiring SCC that would become Sprint, wrote 
that Computer I had illustrated a “plethora” of evidence of the need for specialized 
services more tailored to data users.183 
The FCC also relied on Computer I to justify its final decision.184 The “computer 
inquiry showed that there was dissatisfaction on the part of the computer industry 
and by many data users.”185 The comments in that proceeding left “no doubt” about 
the “increasing and widespread demand” for “diverse and flexible” services that were 
not being “adequately met by the established carriers.”186 It added that, because of 
AT&T’s size, the carrier might be unwilling to serve small niche customers with 
specialized data needs.187 The FCC further concluded that competitive entry would 
“motivate innovations or modifications” by all carriers.188 AT&T, for instance, had 
already responded by announcing plans to build an all-digital network by 1975.189 
The Department of Justice cited AT&T’s response as “striking evidence that even 
the threat of new competition can generate substantial new service offerings.”190 
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One final point is that the FCC’s SCC Order itself was not sufficient to protect 
new competition. Following the order, the Bell System resisted competition by 
denying interconnection with local facilities—which it argued were purely 
“intrastate” and thus outside the FCC’s jurisdiction.191 In the face of the SCCs’ 
complaints, the FCC ultimately required Bell to provide interconnection with the new 
SCCs.192 
3. Foreign Attachments and Interconnection—Carterfone and Beyond 
The FCC also bolstered data services by securing the right to attach equipment to 
the telephone network. The story of this “right of attachment” begins with the FCC’s 
Carterfone decision in 1968.193 During the late 1950s in Texas, Thomas Carter 
developed a device that connected a telephone with a two-way radio.194 With the 
“Carterfone,” a user could remain in contact with a telephone while working on a 
ranch or oil field.195 In a sense, it was a primitive mobile phone. Attaching the 
Carterfone to the telephone network, however, violated AT&T’s tariff, and the 
carrier prohibited its users from connecting a Carterfone to its networks. Some 
Carterfone users claimed that AT&T physically removed their telephones for these 
violations.196 Carter ultimately filed an antitrust claim against AT&T, and the court 
referred the case to the FCC, which ultimately ruled that AT&T’s equipment 
restrictions were illegal.197 The FCC ultimately adopted regulations implementing 
this decision. These rules—still known as the “Part 68” rules—require carriers to 
allow any nonharmful device on their network that conforms to published 
standards.198  
The literature celebrates Carterfone as one of the agency’s most successful 
decisions.199 The decision helped establish the principle that markets—not carriers—will 
decide what equipment customers can use on the telephone network. Users could 
thus purchase their own telephones, modems, and fax machines from third parties 
rather than leasing them from the telephone company. For this reason, the freedom 
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to attach unleashed explosive innovation and competition in the terminal equipment 
market.200 
Carterfone is a familiar story. The literature, however, overlooks some important 
points. First, Computer I likely influenced the Carterfone decision. Indeed, some 
evidence suggests that Carterfone surprised many contemporary observers. Writing 
in 1969, Manley Irwin observed that Carterfone was “as startling to the computer 
industry as it was disappointing to the carriers.”201 The FCC’s unanimous decision, 
however, came less than a year after commenters filed their first round of Computer 
I comments.202 And as explained above, parties had consistently critiqued the foreign 
attachment restrictions in the stream of comments flooding into the FCC.  
Second, Carterfone’s support for innovative equipment stimulated innovation and 
growth in data services as well.203 Most importantly, Carterfone opened the door for 
independent modems on the public telephone network. A contemporary industry 
magazine observed that the FCC’s Carterfone decision “breaks the market for 
modems wide open.”204 As noted earlier, carrier modems had become harmful 
bottlenecks that limited the capabilities of data equipment. With better and cheaper 
modems, the public could enjoy wider access to new data services. 
A final point is that Carterfone alone did not establish a right of attachment. 
AT&T resisted the ruling for years through its revised tariffs. For instance, AT&T 
allowed foreign attachments only if the user first leased a carrier-supplied interface 
device called a protective connecting arrangement, or PCA. In addition to fighting 
the carriers, the FCC also struggled against hostile state regulators, who continued 
enforcing attachment restrictions at the state level.205 In short, it was a slog. The FCC 
engaged in several follow-up proceedings before solidifying the Carterfone 
principles into the Part 68 rules.206 The FCC also successfully preempted the field to 
overcome recalcitrant state regulators, with such preemption being upheld by a 
federal court in 1976 and 1977.207 The larger point is that the right of attachment 
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resulted not merely from the FCC’s initial decision, but from years of additional 
engagement and enforcement efforts. 
By the late 1970s, however, the Carterfone regime was in place. Users could now 
choose from a diverse variety of data equipment, and they credited Carterfone and 
the Part 68 rules for improving the market.208 In 1979, the Computer and Business 
Equipment Manufacturers Association (CBEMA) explained that the market for 
terminal equipment “has been competitive for many years” and that the market now 
“supports hundreds of companies who manufacture modems, terminals, storage 
devices,” and other equipment.209 The Department of Justice noted that unregulated 
third parties provided most of this new equipment.210 The FCC also observed in 
Computer II that “[f]ollowing decisions by this Commission, the terminal equipment 
market is characterized by an increasing amount of new and potential 
competition.”211 As discussed later in the Article, this growth occurred prior to—and 
independently of—the FCC’s 1980 Computer II decision that deregulated customer 
premises equipment.  
4. Resale and Line-Sharing Proceedings 
Finally, the FCC also advanced data services by prohibiting limits on line sharing 
and resale services. Its 1976 Resale Order forced carriers to remove all remaining 
restrictions on these practices.212 Once again, the FCC justified its decision by 
explicitly citing information from the Computer I and SCC proceedings. Both 
proceedings, it explained, had “manifested the existence of a substantially untapped, 
growing public need for non-voice communications.”213  
Easing these restrictions benefited the data industry in several respects.214 First, it 
lowered costs. Customers could now spread the costs of data services among multiple 
parties. As for providers, the Resale Order opened “new markets that hundreds of 
new companies have entered”215 and encouraged “an entire industry of [new] 
resellers.”216 Liberalized resale encouraged new companies by dramatically lowering 
barriers to entry. For instance, any resale provider could now purchase capacity on a 
private line from AT&T (the “underlying carrier” who owned the facilities),217 
                                                                                                                 
 
 208. Comments of McDonnell Douglas Automation Co. at 32, Computer II, No. 20828 
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combine it with innovative data processing features, and resell the entire service as 
one integrated offering to multiple customers. Resellers could also specifically tailor 
these services to the demands of individual industries, such as airlines.218 In short, 
resale promised cheaper and more innovative services. 
Liberal resale and sharing also promoted private-line competition. (As noted 
earlier, data services primarily used private lines to service business customers). In 
the comments, for instance, SCCs such as Southern Pacific (later Sprint) argued that 
resale restrictions had limited its ability to expand service.219 If the company wanted 
to expand to a new city and finish the route by reselling AT&T’s facilities, AT&T 
denied its requests citing tariff restrictions.220 In this respect, the Resale Order both 
facilitated competition and pressured AT&T to reform its services.  
The Resale Order also provided the template for the ultimate Computer II orders, 
though today’s literature generally overlooks this ancestry. In particular, the Resale 
Order tackled challenges that would reemerge in Computer II. For instance, the FCC 
struggled with whether to regulate new resellers that offered both data and 
communications services. Incumbent carriers had argued that the Communications 
Act required the FCC to regulate any “communications” services.221 Incumbents thus 
sought to use regulation to stifle competitive entry. 
The Resale Order addressed this problem in an interesting way. It confirmed that 
Title II222 governed resellers, but it waived several of the statute’s most onerous 
statutory requirements.223 In particular, it liberalized entry and allowed markets to 
dictate prices and service offerings.224 In effect, it deregulated resale services while 
affirming its potential regulatory jurisdiction over them—a pattern the FCC would 
repeat in Computer II a few years later.225  
The Resale Order also anticipated Computer II’s celebrated unbundling and 
structural separation regimes. The FCC worried about a subset of resellers that 
owned facilities that provided monopoly voice services. These carriers could 
potentially cross-subsidize competitive resale services with regulated monopoly 
revenues. To address these concerns, the Resale Order required these specific 
carriers226 to create a separate entity to provide competitive resale services.227 The 
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 219. Comments of S. Pac. Commc’ns at 8–13, Resale Order, No. 20097 (F.C.C. Dec. 
11, 1974). 
 220. Id. at 8–9.  
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 223. Resale Order, supra note 212, at 308 (confirming resale as a common carrier service). 
 224. Id. at 308–12. 
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F.C.C. Plans Strong Hand to Regulate the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2015, at B1. 
 226. The carriers in question were those that both owned facilities and provided monopoly 
voice services. 
 227. Resale Order, supra note 212, at 316 (“[U]nderlying carriers which provide basic 
1338 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 91:1309 
 
communications service would therefore be isolated (or unbundled) from the resale 
service.228  
The FCC explicitly incorporated this model into Computer II a few years later. 
Specifically, it proposed both a separate entity for competitive “enhanced” services 
and required carriers to “unbundle” its basic transmission service.229 Thus, any 
celebrations of Computer II must recognize the contributions of the more obscure 
Resale Order that forged the initial template. 
In sum, the Resale Order facilitated the growth of the data industry in several 
respects. By prohibiting tariff restrictions, the FCC helped to lower the costs of 
communications capacity and to encourage the entry of many new competitive 
providers. The order also ensured that resale carriers and SCCs in competitive 
markets would not face the same Title II regulations as traditional common carriers 
providing monopoly services. Finally, the FCC explicitly modeled Computer II’s 
unbundling and structural separation regimes upon the Resale Order. 
III. THE LIMITS OF COMPUTER INQUIRIES 
The previous section establishes the importance of the pre-Internet proceedings 
as a foundation of the Internet. I also, however, argued that Computer Inquiries 
influenced those proceedings in ways the literature overlooks—by providing 
information. This section, by contrast, argues that the more famous parts of 
Computer Inquiries—its celebrated regulatory decisions—were less consequential 
than the literature assumes. In many instances, Computer Inquiries merely ratified 
the effects of the pre-Internet proceedings. Further, understanding Computer 
Inquiries’ historical context complicates modern narratives that invoke it to justify 
certain deregulatory and regulatory policies. 
A. The Limits of Computer I 
Despite their hype, Computer I’s decisions were narrower than they seem. Most 
importantly, Computer I neglected concerns about costs, network quality, or tariff 
restrictions.230 These concerns, however, were arguably the most pressing issues for 
commenters when Computer I began. Indeed, virtually every noncarrier commenter 
critiqued some aspect of the carriers’ network service offerings in the initial rounds 
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of comments.231 Contemporary scholars also initially assumed the Computer Inquiry 
would address tariff restrictions. For instance, in 1969, Manley Irwin wrote that 
reform to the communications industry has “come about through a re-evaluation of 
long-standing tariff practices.”232 The Computer Inquiry was one “crucial”233 inquiry 
into such practices.234 The FCC, however, exiled these issues from the proceeding 
altogether, deciding instead to address them in individual “rate, tariff and licensing 
proceedings.”235  
We should therefore understand Computer I as a subset of a much larger series of 
proceedings that promoted competition and entry. Indeed, the literature of the late 
1960s often listed the “Computer Inquiry” as merely one of several ongoing FCC 
efforts to liberalize entry and to reform carrier tariffs.236 These articles therefore 
discussed the Computer Inquiry in the context of other equally important proceedings 
involving Carterfone, MCI, the specialized common carriers, authorized user 
restrictions, and the various rate investigations of AT&T.237  
The Computer I decisions themselves broke little new ground, but instead 
reflected well-established practices and norms.238 The FCC (and its predecessors) 
had regulated communications services since the early 1900s. Data services, by 
contrast, developed independently of the phone network and had never been 
regulated.239 In continuing these policies through its regulatory definitions of 
“communications” and “data,” the FCC was effectively pushing on an open door.240 
Further, Computer I’s alleged quarantine of AT&T merely maintained the status quo. 
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The 1956 consent decree already excluded AT&T from the data services market. The 
country’s largest carrier also consistently disclaimed any interest in providing data 
services at the time.241  
Computer I, therefore, deserves less credit for its deregulatory measures than the 
literature recognizes. For one, the FCC never seriously considered regulating data 
services beyond the narrow subset of pure message switching. The earliest comments 
to Computer I universally rejected any notion of regulating data services, which 
commenters viewed as naturally competitive.242 This wide consensus reflects the 
strong norms against regulation that predated the proceeding. Indeed, Manley Irwin 
observed that merely raising the question of data regulation “caught some observers 
by surprise.”243 Robert Cannon also wrote that the FCC became “increasingly 
apologetic” about regulating data as the proceeding went on.244  
The FCC’s enforcement history further illustrates these pre-existing norms. In the 
years following Computer I, the FCC rarely applied the rules at all despite the growth 
in hybrid services. In fact, the FCC pursued only two cases under Computer I—both 
of which involved services by regulated carriers (Western Union and AT&T).245 
There is no evidence that the FCC used the Computer I rules to regulate any 
noncarrier company.  
In addition, the FCC’s deregulation itself was limited in scope. All parties 
implicitly assumed that the underlying telephone network would remain regulated.246 
The key issue in Computer I and the tariff proceedings was not whether to regulate 
common carriers, but how. The primary worry was that carriers would enjoy unfair 
advantages in data markets through cross-subsidization.247 My research, however, 
failed to uncover a single commenter—including common carriers themselves—who 
proposed deregulating the underlying physical transmission service itself.  
If Computer I’s deregulatory measures are overvalued, the same is true for its 
regulatory measures. As stated above, all parties assumed that Title II regulation 
would continue as it had for decades. Even the more novel “maximum separation” 
policy had only modest effects on the industry. The policy only applied to carriers 
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with annual revenues over one million dollars.248 The consent decree, however, 
already excluded the biggest one—AT&T.249 Gerald Faulhaber writes that, because 
of the consent decree, “the separate subsidiary clause had no significance.”250 
Maximum separation also ratified market decisions that several carriers had 
already independently made. GTE and some independent carriers structurally 
separated their communications and data services years before the Computer I 
decisions.251 Western Union noted that “carriers on their own volition have moved 
vigorously to separate their regulated and nonregulated businesses.”252 In this 
respect, Computer I arguably reduced the scope of Title II regulation by granting 
smaller carriers the freedom to integrate their services without strict separation. 
For this reason perhaps, regulated carriers supported the separation requirements. 
Interestingly, GTE did not initially object to the forced separation regulations even 
though it would ultimately sue the FCC over them. Following the 1970 Tentative 
Decision, GTE wrote that it “takes no exception” to the FCC’s decision, and that it 
had “already implemented the safeguards proposed” years earlier.253 GTE only sued 
after the FCC added additional restrictions in its Final Decision.254 Accordingly, my 
research demonstrates that the litigation following Computer I stemmed from a 
narrower dispute than the literature previously recognized. 
Further, Computer I’s regulations likely stunted the growth of a narrow subset 
of computer operations known as “message switching” or “store and function” 
services.255 These services were, in a sense, early forms of email that threatened 
regulated telegram and telex services.256 These services were also difficult to 
classify for regulatory purposes as they included both data processing and 
traditional communications functions. The FCC, however, largely punted on this 
question, ruling that these “hybrid” services would be classified on a case-by-case 
basis depending on the service’s “primary” use.257 This decision arguably harmed 
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 257. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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pure computerized message switching services by potentially subjecting them to 
Title II regulations and entry requirements.258 It also subjected them to 
discrimination because carriers were freer to discriminate against fellow regulated 
carriers.259  
B. The Limits of Computer II 
1. Computer II as Follower 
Computer II is the more famous—and lasting—part of the Computer Inquiries 
proceedings. Recall that the final order announced three key decisions.260 First, its 
definitions divided the world into regulated “basic” transmission services and 
deregulated “enhanced” services. Second, the FCC allowed regulated carriers to offer 
enhanced services and CPE (terminal equipment) subject to unbundling and 
structural separation requirements. Third, the FCC deregulated all terminal 
equipment, or CPE.261  
The literature celebrates these decisions as a key foundation for the growth of data 
services and ultimately the Internet.262 When viewed in historical context, however, 
they are less consequential than they appear. The literature inverts the causal 
relationship of Computer II and the growth of data services. Computer II was largely 
an effect of growth rather than a significant cause. The growth of the 1970s arose 
from technological innovation and the favorable legal environment that the 
pre-Internet proceedings had created. By the time the FCC adopted the final 
Computer II definitions in 1980, the sheer diversity of new services and equipment 
had rendered several Computer II decisions a fait accompli. In short, the pre-Internet 
proceedings led, while Computer II followed.  
The FCC’s deregulation of CPE illustrates this dynamic. The growth of terminal 
equipment traces back to the 1968 Carterfone decision, which affirmed the freedom 
to attach equipment.263 While carriers and state regulators resisted this regime for 
years, the FCC had firmly established this right in the late 1970s following multiple 
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enforcement proceedings and court challenges.264 The equipment market was 
therefore thriving well before the FCC decided Computer II.265  
This rapid growth arguably forced the FCC’s hand in both its definition and 
deregulation of CPE. Because things were moving so fast, the FCC had little choice 
but to deregulate the entire field. For instance, in its 1979 Computer II Tentative 
Decision, the FCC emphasized its inability to coherently divide regulated 
“communications” equipment from unregulated “data processing” equipment. The 
“rapidly changing” evolution of CPE would inevitably make any division “arbitrary” 
and would “result in a regulatory quagmire.”266 Despite these obstacles, the FCC 
initially clung to regulatory distinctions that turned on whether CPE offered “basic 
media conversion” functions.267 Following a round of hostile comments, the FCC 
abandoned this effort in its Computer II Final Decision a year later. It acknowledged 
that its definition scheme “garnered little support” and had been “uniformly 
criticized.”268 It therefore deregulated CPE altogether in light of the “rapid pace of 
technological evolution.”269 
The larger point is that a combination of technological innovation and a favorable 
regulatory environment largely determined the outcome in Computer II. By 
liberalizing tariffs, the pre-Internet proceedings accelerated technological evolution 
in terminal equipment, which in turn made it impossible to craft coherent regulatory 
distinctions. Further, liberalized entry gave rise to a new coalition of equipment 
vendors and customers who could (and did) exert political pressure on the agency. 
In this respect, the tariff proceedings created a favorable feedback effect. Easier entry 
expanded the number of companies. That expanded number, in turn, lobbied for even 
stronger protections for competition.270 
This dynamic also drove the FCC’s treatment of “enhanced” services. Data 
services had enjoyed tremendous growth in the decade prior to Computer II’s final 
order.271 Much like with the CPE markets, the FCC’s pre-Internet proceedings helped 
accelerate this growth by intervening to liberalize carrier tariffs and to introduce new 
competition that pressured carriers to improve the telephone network. Indeed, the 
proceedings’ records list several examples of AT&T responding (very quickly) to 
new competitive threats by upgrading its network, providing better service offerings, 
and permitting greater sharing.272 Observers in the late 1970s specifically credited 
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the tariff proceedings for helping establish a phone network that was now adequate 
for most data services’ needs.273  
More broadly, the rise of specialized common carriers and resale providers 
generated increased investment and competition in private-line markets. The 
approval of MCI immediately triggered hundreds of new applications from 
specialized carriers, many of whom aimed to tailor their services for data 
customers.274 This expanded infrastructure became the bedrock of the Internet, which 
ultimately combined many of these preexisting networks through the shared TCP/IP 
(transmission control protocol/internet protocol) protocol.275  
These developments frustrated the FCC’s efforts to craft coherent definitions. 
Indeed, commenters uniformly criticized the FCC’s initial “definitional approach” as 
vague and unworkable in light of rapid technological change.276 The FCC finally 
settled on the now familiar definitions of basic and enhanced services. These 
definitions, however, were simpler and more humble efforts.277 For instance, the FCC 
defined “basic” service narrowly to include only pure transmission capacity.278 
“Enhanced” services, by contrast, were everything else. The FCC defined them 
negatively in terms of what they were not—namely, “any offering . . . which is more 
than a basic transmission service.”279 These humble definitions reflected the futility 
of the FCC’s earlier efforts to draw coherent lines. Indeed, the FCC defended its 
ultimate approach by citing the “ever continuing convergence of communications 
and data processing”280 and the need to “comport[] with the actual development of 
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this dynamic industry.”281 In short, enhanced services had become too complex to 
classify.  
The dynamics unleashed by the pre-Internet proceedings influenced not only the 
FCC’s definitions of enhanced services, but also their deregulation. Initially, the FCC 
wanted to continue regulating certain enhanced services. “Enhanced,” however, was 
not coextensive with the FCC’s older definition of “data.” Instead, it encompassed a 
much broader category of services that easily qualified as communications 
services.282 For instance, a reseller might purchase a private line from AT&T to offer 
an integrated “enhanced” package of communications and data services. The 
challenge was whether to regulate the “communications” component of enhanced 
services under Title II.  
Initially, the FCC clung to its older definitions. Its Computer II Tentative Decision 
affirmed that enhanced communications services would remain regulated, and thus 
subject to tariff requirements.283 In its Computer II Final Decision, however, the FCC 
ultimately abandoned efforts to make these distinctions and deregulated the entire 
category.284 In reaching this conclusion (against its initial preferences), the FCC 
repeatedly emphasized the practical impossibility of drawing coherent lines in the 
face of such explosive technological evolution. It wrote: 
[W]e conclude that further attempts to . . . distinguish enhanced services 
would be ultimately futile . . . . [O]ver the long run, any attempt to 
distinguish enhanced services will not result in regulatory certainty. . . . 
There are literally thousands of unregulated computer service vendors 
offering competing services connected to the interstate 
telecommunications network. The services they provide are many and 
varied. The only limitation [sic] . . . are those arising from the constraints 
of their own entrepreneurial capabilities and . . . the implicit requirement 
that they structure their services so as to avoid crossing a regulatory 
boundary that would subject them to regulation.285 
Much like with CPE, the FCC’s ultimate deregulatory decisions evolved 
considerably from its initial preferences. Its final definitions, however, were reactive. 
They were driven both by technological growth that made distinctions impossible 
and by the emergence of a new coalition of carriers, providers, and customers who 
strongly opposed efforts to impose restrictions. A key foundation of these 
developments, in turn, was the pre-Internet proceedings in the years before Computer 
II, which had helped accelerate and expand these forces. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 281. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 422. 
 282. Computer II Tentative Decision, supra note 21, at 390 (“‘[E]nhanced non-voice’ 
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2. Computer II in Historical Context 
Because of its perceived success, Computer II is often cited to justify modern 
regulatory and deregulatory policies. The historical context described above, 
however, challenges some of these uses. In particular, the modern literature often 
overlooks the embedded—and often unspoken—assumptions of Computer II that 
complicate traditional narratives.  
a. Computer II as Deregulation 
When viewed in context, Computer II provides little support for those who invoke 
it to justify broad deregulation. For instance, one question in the modern network 
neutrality debates is whether to isolate and reclassify one piece of broadband 
access—the physical transmission layer—for Title II regulation.286 Some opponents 
of this approach cite Computer II to justify their resistance. For instance, Fred 
Campbell, former FCC Wireless Chief, cites Computer II in arguing against such 
regulation. Computer II, he argues, illustrates both the futility of drawing coherent 
categories and the dangers of creating regulatory disparity among industry players.287  
These arguments, however, overlook Computer II’s embedded background 
assumptions. Specifically, Computer II always assumed that extensive regulation 
would continue at the physical layer. The entire edifice of Computer II rested on Title 
II’s continuing regulation of a distinct and isolated basic service. Indeed, the very 
term “enhanced” implies a service that builds upon a foundational platform.  
Modern audiences should therefore understand that Computer II’s deregulatory 
language implicitly excluded physical transmission. Donald Dunn, a main author of 
the original Computer I SRI reports, stated, “[T]here is no serious argument about 
the appropriateness of some sort of regulation of firms operating only at level 1 [i.e., 
the basic physical transmission layer].”288 Accordingly, Computer II’s language 
about the difficulties of drawing distinctions was limited to higher-layer enhanced 
services. Everyone assumed regulation of the underlying telephone network would 
continue.  
The key questions therefore involved whether to regulate newer companies that 
incorporated “basic” transmission within a larger service. The Resale Order that 
predated Computer II illustrates this dynamic. Much like “enhanced,” the term 
“resale” implies a foundational regulated service that will be “resold.” When the FCC 
relaxed regulation for resale carriers, it nonetheless assumed that these carriers would 
                                                                                                                 
 
 286. Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, 5612–16 (2014) 
(providing notice of proposed rulemaking and requesting comment on reclassification 
authority for network neutrality rules). 
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2016] THE FCC AND THE “PRE-INTERNET” 1347 
 
build upon regulated communications services. The agency explained, “[W]e 
anticipate that resale services will be provided by entities which do not provide 
monopoly services . . . .”289 Instead, it assumed these newer carriers would purchase 
capacity from underlying monopoly carriers.290 
Computer II’s concerns about regulatory disparity were similarly confined to 
enhanced services. Following the Resale Order, the FCC had created a regime that 
treated resale communications carriers better than resale data providers. Resale 
communications carriers could easily expand into data without triggering additional 
regulatory burdens. Pure data vendors, however, would trigger Title II regulations if 
they expanded into communications service.291 In Computer II, the FCC solved the 
problem by sweeping all these resale services into the “enhanced” category and 
deregulating the entire category to avoid regulatory disparity.292 These actions, 
however, were confined to enhanced services that built upon basic service. All parties 
assumed that regulatory disparity would continue between basic transmission 
providers and everyone else. In short, the debate simply involved one layer. 
The larger point is that contemporary parties assumed a clear division between 
monopoly providers and everyone else. This assumption is reflected in both the 
Resale Order and Computer II, both of which assumed the existence of a 
foundational transmission service that would remain distinct and regulated. Not a 
single party in either proceeding assumed that the diversity of enhanced and resale 
services provided a reason to deregulate the entire network at all layers. Such a 
measure would have been unthinkable to contemporary parties.  
b. Computer II as Regulation 
History also challenges those who invoke Computer II to justify certain types of 
regulation. The literature often supports these arguments by citing the success of 
Computer II’s unbundling and structural separation requirements.293 These measures, 
it claims, constrained carriers and opened the network for data services and, 
eventually, internet service providers. Susan Crawford has also argued that the 
unbundling requirement reinforced the norm of separation of transport and data—a 
norm she persuasively identifies as a key theme in American communications law 
history.294  
This particular unbundling requirement, however, has a more ambiguous history. 
At the time of Computer II, the unbundling requirement actually loosened regulations 
on many carriers. Indeed, many parties objected to Computer II on the precise ground 
that it provided too much freedom to incumbent carriers.295 Prior to the Computer II 
                                                                                                                 
 
 289. Resale Order, supra note 212, at 315–16.  
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 291. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 10, at 426–27. 
 292. Id. at 427–28. 
 293. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text; see also NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, 
supra note 33, at 190–91. 
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Final Decision, the FCC imposed separation requirements on incumbent carriers 
providing data services (at least those with revenues over one million dollars).296 The 
FCC, however, eliminated these requirements for all carriers except, ultimately, 
AT&T. Instead of separating their data services in a subsidiary, carriers merely had 
to unbundle them. 
The unbundling requirement itself, however, provided relatively weak protection. 
The primary motivation for unbundling was to prevent cross-subsidies, rather than 
more modern concerns about blocking.297 The end of structural separation, however, 
expanded opportunities to subsidize enhanced service offerings (paying for physical 
transmission, for instance, was not the only cost).298 Further, unbundling itself would 
have accomplished little without the pre-Internet proceedings. Even with 
unbundling, a carrier could still limit a future internet service provider by applying 
restrictions on resale, interconnection, and equipment attachment. 
Another theme in the literature is that Computer II focused primarily on restricting 
AT&T.299 The problem, however, is that Computer II seems designed to help AT&T 
expand into new markets in several respects.  
First, the FCC likely initiated Computer II in the first place to help AT&T. The 
literature, however, traditionally explains that Computer II responded to problems 
with the FCC’s “hybrid” category, which created an “inundat[ion]” of “applications 
concerning hybrid services.”300 The contemporary comments filed in Computer II, 
however, tell a different story. Contrary to current perceptions, many parties were 
satisfied with the hybrid approach and urged the FCC to leave it alone.301 They 
viewed its flexibility as protective because it ensured that the incidental use of 
communications would not trigger common carrier regulation.302  
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The comments also contradict the argument that Computer I’s rules had imposed 
excessive administrative costs on the FCC. Xerox explicitly stated that the FCC has 
“not been flooded with requests to resolve such issues.”303 GTE Telenet (an early 
packet-switching service) explained that the FCC had applied the Computer I rules 
in only two cases since 1971—both of which involved carrier-provided services.304 
In fact, there is a not a single instance of the Computer I rules being applied adversely 
against a noncarrier “hybrid” service during this time—despite repeated requests.305  
A more likely proximate cause of the Computer II proceeding was not a frustration 
with hybrid services but with AT&T’s new Dataspeed terminal—a device that 
blurred the line between communications and data equipment. The Department of 
Justice’s 1956 consent decree had limited AT&T to providing only 
“communications” equipment (e.g., telephones, telex terminals).306 It could not 
manufacture or sell data processing devices such as computers. AT&T could, 
however, sell advanced types of communications devices such as teletype machines, 
which allowed users to send written messages (similar to telegrams or even e-mail) 
over telephone lines.307  
In 1974, AT&T pushed the envelope by introducing its new Dataspeed 
terminal.308 While the terminals themselves did not contain much processing ability, 
they provided access to a separate computer and thus functioned similarly to a 
computer from the user’s perspective.309 Companies like IBM challenged the device, 
arguing that AT&T was attempting to provide data processing equipment in violation 
of the 1956 consent decree.310 The FCC, however, ultimately approved the device, 
finding it incidental to communications and thus legal.311 This dispute directly 
inspired Computer II according to the Department of Justice in its comments.312 The 
Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users similarly claimed that Computer II was a 
“review” of the FCC’s earlier Dataspeed decision.313 In releasing the initial 
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Computer II notice, one FCC commissioner noted that AT&T’s Dataspeed terminal 
created a “watershed” question.314 And indeed, Dataspeed was one of the first issues 
mentioned in the Computer II Supplemental Notice a year later.315 These references 
to the link between Dataspeed and Computer II are also consistent with the 
contemporary legal literature.316  
In addition, Computer II’s definition of “enhanced” services helped AT&T enter 
new data and equipment markets. The FCC adopted these definitions in the shadow 
of the Department of Justice’s 1956 consent decree, which limited AT&T to 
“communications” services. The Computer II definition, however, used the term 
“enhanced,” which encompassed both communications and data services. Because 
enhanced services and equipment could be “communications” or “incidental” to 
communications, AT&T would be free to offer them.317 In short, Computer II’s 
definition erased the wall that had quarantined AT&T from data markets.318 
Several contemporary parties criticized Computer II on these precise grounds, 
alleging that it implicitly repealed the 1956 consent decree.319 GTE Telenet was 
particularly critical: “A proceeding begun . . . for the ostensible purpose of 
fine-tuning [definitions] . . . has become the vehicle for an ultra vires and manifestly 
incorrect interpretation of the 1956 Consent Decree.”320 The Computer and 
Communications Industry Association (CCIA) argued that Computer II illegally 
modified the consent decree.321 MCI wrote that “the Decision authorizes the 
provision by AT&T of data processing services.”322 It claimed the FCC’s entire 
motivation for establishing separate resale entities (for facility-owning carriers) was 
to benefit AT&T. This desire to help AT&T, however, had unintended consequences. 
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Specifically, it resulted in a “harsh sanction against the specialized common carriers 
for owning rather than leasing their facilities.”323  
The FCC’s controversial extension of ancillary jurisdiction over enhanced 
services also benefited AT&T’s potential expansion. In the Final Decision, the FCC 
deregulated enhanced services but affirmed that it retained jurisdiction over them.324 
Several parties critiqued this position, claiming the FCC was illegally expanding its 
authority to data services.325 The reality, however, was that this decision helped 
facilitate AT&T’s potential expansion into new data and terminal markets. As stated 
earlier, “enhanced” services included both data and communications components.326 
The Communications Act, however, arguably required the FCC to regulate any 
communications service.327 Indeed, AT&T itself initially opposed deregulating 
enhanced services because it might threaten its ability to provide them.328  
The FCC solved the puzzle with a neat trick—it deregulated via new regulation. 
More specifically, by extending ancillary jurisdiction to enhanced services, the FCC 
could plausibly claim that it was in fact regulating enhanced communications 
services.329 The FCC concluded that “[s]o long as the service is not wholly data 
processing and devoid of any communications elements, the [FCC’s] jurisdiction 
reaches it.”330 CBEMA made the point more explicitly: “This broad jurisdiction is 
asserted in order to fashion a basis upon which AT&T can participate in the 
deregulated enhanced services market.”331 AT&T, however, defended the FCC’s 
extension of jurisdiction. It wrote that Computer II is “not deregulating[,] nor is it 
authorizing the Bell System to provide services outside the scope of communications 
as contemplated by the [1956] Decree.”332 
The FCC Commissioners’ statements provide further evidence of the motivation 
to help AT&T. Commissioner Quello wrote that Computer II is a “first step along 
the road to full participation of AT&T and GTE in the provision of ‘enhanced’ 
telecommunications services.”333 Commissioner Ferris suggested that the 
deregulation of enhanced services was an attempt to allow AT&T to expand while 
preventing competitors from being “ensnarled in needless regulation.”334 Because of 
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Computer II, “AT&T will be able to participate aggressively in markets where our 
traditional regulation is being withdrawn.”335 Commissioner Washburn opened his 
statement by noting the benefits to AT&T: “I heartily approve today’s action which 
will enable AT&T and GTE to actively participate in the dynamic new technologies 
of the future.”336 Commissioner Jones also opened her statement explaining that “I 
firmly believe that it is in the public interest that AT&T and GTE be allowed to 
participate actively . . . .”337  
These statements undermine the claim that the Computer II regime aimed 
primarily to impose constraints upon AT&T and incumbent carriers more generally. 
If so, AT&T—the dominant carrier of its day—seemed quite pleased with the 
result.338 In the litigation challenging Computer II, many attacked the FCC for 
relaxing these requirements and enabling AT&T to expand into new markets.339 
AT&T’s brief, however, defended each of the FCC’s decisions, including the 
structural separation and unbundling requirements.340  
The conclusion that Computer II attempted to help AT&T is, somewhat ironically, 
consistent with the FCC’s strong language about the importance of using regulatory 
protections to prevent bottleneck control of key facilities.341 At the time, some parties 
challenged the remaining restrictions on AT&T as too severe. For instance, 
Commissioner Jones argued that she was “not . . . satisfied that the degree of 
separation . . . is justified . . . .”342 Fearing legal challenges, the FCC needed to 
establish a record to justify the continuing structural separation requirements. More 
speculatively, the FCC may have adopted strong language as a way to emphasize the 
remaining regulatory protections and to preempt criticism that Computer II was 
motivated to help AT&T. In any event, the FCC’s language should not obscure the 
larger point that Computer II aimed to secure AT&T’s ability to enter competitive 
new markets for data services and terminal equipment.  
* * * * 
In sum, the literature does not adequately reflect important aspects of Computer 
Inquiries’ history. One question, then, is why? One explanation is simply that the 
FCC addressed many of these important issues outside of the Computer Inquiries 
proceedings. From their outset, both the Computer I and Computer II proceedings 
omitted issues regarding network adequacy and carrier tariffs restrictions.343 Because 
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the subsequent Computer Inquiries orders did not discuss them, they are less likely 
to be reflected in literature that relies on those orders.  
Another possibility is that the open access debates of the late 1990s and early 
2000s transformed Computer Inquiries.344 The Internet initially developed on the 
telephone network, where traditional norms and laws had created a sharp division 
between physical transmission and higher-layer content. Dial-up service, for 
instance, relied heavily on the telephone lines of regulated Title II carriers.345 It was 
easy to take this divide for granted until new technologies—particularly cable 
broadband—put pressure on the traditional regime.346  
For cable companies who wanted to resist common carrier rules, Computer II’s 
deregulation provided a helpful analogy. From their perspective, Computer II 
deregulated enhanced services because they integrated communications and data 
components. Cable broadband, some argued, similarly combined transmission and 
information into one undifferentiated enhanced service (or “information service,” 
using today’s nomenclature).347 Because the physical transmission component could 
not be individually isolated, the entire service should be deregulated just as it was in 
Computer II. 
Other parties, however, strongly favored applying traditional regulation to cable 
broadband access. To them, the physical network should remain open and 
nondiscriminatory to promote innovation and entry. Otherwise, owners of physical 
facilities—that is, cable and telephone companies—would have too much power 
over companies (such as internet service providers and content providers) who 
required access to the physical infrastructure.348  
For these critics of deregulation, Computer II’s unbundling regime provided a 
helpful analogy.349 Under Computer II, carriers had to isolate the basic physical 
transmission service and make it available to all other entities on a nondiscriminatory 
basis. By analogy, they argued, cable companies should provide “open access” to its 
physical infrastructure to any competitive ISP—including the hundreds of dial-ups 
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that existed at the time.350 This debate became known as the open access debate, but 
it ultimately evolved into the more modern network neutrality debate. In short, 
Computer Inquiries provided helpful analogies to all parties. And it is likely not a 
coincidence that Robert Cannon’s seminal article on Computer Inquiries’ legacy was 
published in 2002 at the height of the open access debates.351 
IV. WHY IT MATTERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN POLICY AND THE LITERATURE 
This Part explains why the pre-Internet’s history is relevant to modern policy 
debates and the current literature. First, the history illustrates that government 
interventions were both necessary to the rise of the Internet and were more extensive 
than the current literature often acknowledges. In particular, it illustrates the long 
tradition of regulating uncompetitive physical network layers—and thus has 
important parallels with the modern network neutrality debate. Second, the history 
illustrates that the FCC possesses a diverse and interrelated set of policy levers for 
encouraging a competitive environment. In this respect, the focus on network 
neutrality may be obscuring other equally important policy levers that can protect the 
open Internet. 
A. The Public Origins of the Pre-Internet 
The first lesson of the pre-Internet’s history is that government mattered. It 
therefore challenges the commonly held view that the Internet’s growth relied on a 
“light touch” deregulatory approach.352 Specifically, the Internet’s growth depended 
on a series of pro-competitive regulatory efforts that created a salubrious 
environment for data services to grow and evolve. While some scholars have 
recognized the importance of such regulatory efforts,353 the pre-Internet proceedings 
provide additional concrete examples of how the FCC’s intervention fueled the 
growth of the Internet’s ancestral data networks. Without regulatory intervention, 
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carriers’ tariffs would have stymied the growth of innovative data services and 
equipment. Instead, the FCC accelerated technological innovation by promoting 
entry, introducing competitive pressure, and securing rights of interconnection, 
equipment attachment, resale, and line sharing.354 It also followed through to protect 
these reforms in the face of evasion and hostile state regulators. 
In addition, the FCC’s regulatory efforts focused almost exclusively on the 
uncompetitive physical-layer services, which at that time meant the incumbent 
telephone network facilities. In this respect, the pre-Internet proceedings provide a 
better example of layered regulation than Computer Inquiries itself. In virtually all 
of the pre-Internet proceedings, the FCC intervened against the uncompetitive 
physical layer to promote competition in higher-layer markets that relied on physical 
network access as a necessary input.  
Accordingly, the FCC’s pre-Internet proceedings illustrate market-creating 
regulation, as opposed to more traditional command and control, New Deal-style 
regulation. The Carterfone proceeding, for instance, helped create new cars by 
guaranteeing access to the roads. Specifically, it regulated the uncompetitive physical 
layer to generate growth for the equipment and private networks attached to it.355 
Similarly, the resale and line sharing reforms also helped new data services that relied 
upon physical network services.356 Liberalizing entry for specialized common 
carriers achieved these same goals through market pressure at the physical layer.357  
This history has several implications for modern debates, particularly the current 
network neutrality debate. First, it illustrates the long and successful history of 
pro-market regulation of uncompetitive physical access infrastructure. In this 
respect, it bolsters the normative arguments for network neutrality (or “Open 
Internet”) regulation to prevent discrimination by lower-layer access providers 
against higher-layer content and applications.  
Indeed, the current case for nondiscrimination protections is even stronger given 
that today’s Internet access market increasingly resembles the monopoly telephone 
era. As Susan Crawford has persuasively argued, high-speed broadband has 
effectively become a cable monopoly.358 While numerous cable companies exist, 
customers generally only have access to one in a local area. Accordingly, modern 
applications that require higher speeds depend on cable infrastructure as completely 
as data services once depended on AT&T and incumbent carriers. The pre-Internet 
history thus challenges those who claim the earlier history is irrelevant because it 
involved traditional monopoly telephone networks.359 The pre-Internet proceedings 
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(and Computer Inquiries, for that matter) focused on competitiveness, not 
technology. Throughout these historical proceedings, commenters urged the FCC to 
focus on economics rather than specific technology in adopting rules. Commenters 
argued that monopoly carriers should be regulated more heavily than 
competitive-resale and private-line competitors who lacked pricing power, even 
though they often used identical technologies.360 And indeed, both the Resale Order 
and the Computer II Final Decision ultimately reflected this approach.361  
More precisely, the pre-Internet history strengthens the normative case for the 
FCC’s recent decision to isolate and “reclassify” broadband access as a Title II 
service.362 As noted earlier, critics claim isolating the physical layer for regulation 
would be practically impossible and would create regulatory disparity.363  
The history of the pre-Internet, however, undermines these critiques. Specifically, 
it illustrates the long tradition of separating physical transmission service from 
higher-layer information services for regulatory purposes. For instance, when the 
FCC deregulated “enhanced services” because these services inextricably combined 
data and communications functions, it was referring only to services that built upon 
basic regulated transmission. Some parties today, however, interpret this language as 
applying to the entire network—including physical transmission.364 Such arguments, 
however, ignore the key background assumptions of Computer Inquiries’ decisions 
and the pre-Internet proceedings more broadly. Indeed, the history of AT&T’s 
control over the telephone network is a cautionary tale for those who would give 
private companies excessive control over vital communications infrastructure. 
B. A Diverse Toolkit for Enforcement 
A separate implication, however, is that protecting the open Internet is more 
complicated than it looks. The rise of the pre-Internet depended not merely upon 
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government action per se, but upon a diverse set of interrelated proceedings.365 For 
similar reasons, creating an open and competitive environment today will depend on 
several interrelated policy levers—and the political will to enforce them. In this 
respect, the pre-Internet history illustrates the diverse toolkit that the FCC possesses 
to achieve the goals of better, faster, and cheaper broadband service.  
Network neutrality is one important component of that toolkit, but it is not the 
only one. For instance, even with strong network neutrality rules, low-income and 
rural areas would still need greater access to high-speed broadband.366 New video 
applications could also be strangled by data caps, discriminatory peering agreements, 
or simply a lack of capacity. Wireless broadband would still need greater spectrum 
allocations (particularly of unlicensed spectrum) and more affordable special access 
services.367 In short, network neutrality—like Computer Inquiries before it—is not 
the only game in town.  
In this respect, perhaps the most specific policy lesson is the importance of 
creating competition—or at least credible competitive threats—at the physical layer. 
Liberalizing entry for new competitive carriers was arguably the FCC’s most 
important contribution to early data networks. These carriers threatened AT&T’s 
overpriced private and business line services. And even if the new carriers did not 
always survive, the credible threat of competition led AT&T to improve its network 
and reform its services in ways that ultimately benefited data services and facilitated 
the Internet’s rise. In this sense, competition created significant spillover benefits for 
everyone that relied on the telephone network for data services.368 
Competitive entry in today’s broadband access markets could create similar 
positive externalities. Competition, however, is notoriously difficult to create 
because of the significant barriers to entry that competitive access providers must 
overcome.369 Broadband networks exhibit natural monopoly characteristics, and 
cable broadband enjoys a functional monopoly for higher-speed broadband 
service.370 As a result, cable broadband is both too expensive and too slow relative 
to the broadband services enjoyed in several other countries.371  
One potential candidate, then, for competitive entry today is municipal broadband 
networks. Given the high barriers of entry, city and state governments have 
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significant financial advantages over private companies in constructing new 
networks. In addition to being able to raise money through taxes or bonds, 
government networks would not necessarily have to earn a profit as quickly—or at 
all. Many states, however, have recently passed laws that prevent municipalities from 
developing broadband networks.372 These incumbent protection statutes are harmful 
not merely because they prevent the rise of new networks, but because they eliminate 
the threat of competitive entry. With these statutes in place, municipalities cannot 
threaten to develop their own networks if cable providers refuse to lower prices or 
enhance service offerings. The FCC, however, could help municipal networks grow 
by preempting these protectionist statutes. 
Another policy lesson that the pre-Internet history provides is that public 
disclosure and transparency can be an effective check on network owners. Indeed, 
this Article contends that the most important legacy of Computer Inquiries was not 
its rules, but its role as a source of information for contemporary tariff proceedings. 
The proceedings not only “shamed” AT&T to make changes, but they also provided 
an institutional forum for the public to organize and air grievances about the current 
state of network services.  
Disclosure could serve a similar function for broadband access regulation 
today.373 While not sufficient on its own, disclosure could provide an important 
check on access providers regardless of the statutory authority the FCC ultimately 
chooses for network neutrality rules. In fact, disclosure would be even more effective 
in the age of social media where concerns can be publicized quickly and at little cost. 
In this respect, disclosure allows the FCC to crowdsource its oversight of access 
providers. The very existence of the disclosure requirement would also deter access 
providers from engaging in misconduct in the first place, much like the warrant 
requirement preemptively deters police misconduct. 
A separate lesson that the pre-Internet history provides is the importance of public 
engagement to opening the telephone network to new advanced services. Admittedly, 
this transition had several sources. Technological innovation played an important 
role, as did the FCC’s legal choices that accelerated those developments. However, 
one important motivation for the FCC’s discretionary actions was the public pressure 
and engagement from a diverse range of stakeholders.  
Public engagement will be especially important to facilitate municipal broadband 
projects and other competitive private entrants such as Google Fiber.374 In Georgia, 
for instance, a coalition of public interest groups, municipal governments, and tech 
companies resisted efforts of the state legislature to limit municipalities’ ability to 
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establish public broadband networks.375 These efforts required local communities to 
realize the benefits that competition could provide in terms of quality and pricing. In 
this respect, the Georgia coalition could provide a blueprint for future organizing 
efforts. 
One particularly important stakeholder is the business community. Indeed, 
American businesses played an important role in the pre-Internet’s rise by 
publicizing the problems with AT&T’s networks and advocating for tariff reforms.376 
This community included a diverse coalition that included airlines, banks, energy 
companies, transportation companies, equipment manufacturers, retail 
manufacturing companies, and newspaper organizations to name a few. These parties 
recognized their interest in cheaper and better networks that would allow them to 
offer and benefit from new types of data services and terminal equipment. Further, 
the FCC’s tariff reforms had a dynamic effect upon this coalition. By reducing the 
costs of competitive entry, public pressure helped create entirely new companies and 
industries that could, in turn, exert even more pressure upon policymakers.377 This 
pressure provided an important balance to the weight of AT&T, which had both 
considerable resources and long experience influencing policymakers. 
The implication for today is that the business community could play a similarly 
important role in modern broadband access debates. Much like the companies 
participating in Computer Inquiries, the business community would benefit from 
open networks that are as fast and cheap as possible. Unlike that time, however, the 
business community has greater ideological aversion to regulation than existed in the 
era of Computer Inquiries. Although tech companies such as Google and Netflix 
have actively supported open Internet protections,378 much of the general business 
community has stayed on the sidelines or actively opposed regulations through 
representatives such as the Chamber of Commerce.379 Indeed, until recently, even 
many tech companies that more clearly depend on nondiscriminatory access have 
often been silent or offered only half-hearted support through ad hoc organizations. 
The modern debate thus lacks the adversarial relationship between business 
customers and carriers that was so vital in the Computer Inquiries and tariff 
proceedings.  
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A final lesson the pre-Internet history provides is the importance of the FCC’s 
discretionary enforcement. During the 1960s and 1970s, the specific content of the 
governing statutes and regulations was arguably less important than the FCC’s 
discretionary commitment to policy goals—and the public’s willingness to demand 
oversight. For instance, telephone carriers discriminated against competitors for 
years despite being subject to extensive Title II regulation. Similarly, the celebrated 
Computer I and Computer II rules alone would have provided only limited protection 
against restrictions relating to interconnection, equipment attachment, resale and line 
sharing. Change occurred only when the FCC decided to use its statutory authority 
in a new way. Indeed, the FCC’s mere opening of these proceedings protected data 
services by generating information, creating pressure for reforms, and imposing 
checks on the carriers. 
The larger point is that the content of the FCC’s statutory authority may prove 
less important ultimately than its enforcement priorities.380 Even if courts ultimately 
reject reclassification, the FCC’s alternative source of statutory authority (Section 
706381) provides substantive authority to make credible enforcement threats for a 
wide range of actions. Using this authority, the FCC could not only implement rules, 
it could initiate investigations and enforcement actions for several types of harmful 
conduct that potentially threatens innovation such as discriminatory data caps, 
interconnection and peering agreements, municipal broadband restrictions, and 
overbroad congestion management practices. Indeed, merely initiating the 
proceedings—and drawing public attention to these practices—would itself be an 
important political check and a reinforcement of nondiscriminatory norms. The 
flipside of this lesson is that reclassification will provide little protection without the 
FCC’s political willingness to enforce its rules. 
C. Addressing Objections 
The rise of data networks and the Internet had many causes. Computer Inquiries 
is part of that story, but overemphasizing its role can obscure the contributions of 
other forces that helped make these changes possible. One potential objection, 
however, is that this Article focuses too heavily on the developments that led to 
Computer Inquiries rather than looking at what followed. For instance, one might 
argue that Computer Inquiries was important for the Internet’s subsequent 
development in the 1980s and 1990s. Further, to the extent Computer Inquiries 
reflected preexisting norms, it nonetheless played an important role in reinforcing 
and solidifying those norms in ways that further facilitated the Internet’s growth. 
To be clear, Computer Inquiries’ rules were not irrelevant to the growth of the 
Internet. This Article, however, provides a corrective to modern assessments of its 
relative causal effects. The broader history illustrates that the key legal choices and 
the market growth that led to the Internet were largely in place prior to the final 
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Computer II rules in 1980. While Computer Inquiries may well have reinforced those 
developments, they were not the germinating source of the change as the literature 
often implies. The rules alone would have been ineffective without the sustained 
oversight and enforcement proceedings that the FCC imposed during this time. 
Further, it is difficult to isolate the subsequent effects of Computer Inquiries from 
other contemporary developments. Most importantly, the divestiture of AT&T 
occurred at approximately the same time the Computer II rules were intended to go 
into effect. This action resulted in a structural separation of the local Bell companies 
from the more competitive long-distance and terminal equipment divisions, which 
retained the name “AT&T.” Under the modified final judgment (MFJ), the local Bell 
monopolies were forbidden from offering information services (an updated term for 
“enhanced” services) and were subject to various nondiscrimination requirements.382 
The protections were far more extensive and lasting than Computer II, which had 
actually attempted to relax regulation in important respects. In this respect, the MFJ 
altered and amplified the Computer Inquiries regime that preceded it. 
Finally, space limitations prevent pursuing other important factors that should be 
addressed in future research. For instance, the growing ideological embrace of 
competition played an important role in the history of data networks. Relatedly, the 
contingent choices of reform-minded FCC officials, such as Bernard Strassburg at the 
Common Carrier Bureau, also deserve more attention than they received here. Finally, 
more should also be said about the third proceeding in the mid-1980s—Computer 
III.383 The influence of this proceeding is more difficult to measure. For one, federal 
courts invalidated much of the Computer III rules, and the complex proceedings 
dragged on for many years.384 In addition, Computer III takes place in the shadow of 
the AT&T divestiture as the FCC tried to relax structural separation requirements.385 
While the influence of Computer III on the Internet’s development deserves more 
attention, the first two proceedings are generally seen as creating the foundation for 
data networks’ growth.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s primary argument is that the FCC played a critical role in building 
the pre-Internet in ways the current literature overlooks. Although Computer 
Inquiries gets much of the credit, the FCC’s more important contribution was its 
regulatory interventions in the pre-Internet proceedings. It is difficult to square this 
history with modern claims that the Internet’s growth depended on “light touch” 
deregulatory measures. As the pre-Internet history illustrates, this latter claim is true 
only with respect to higher-layer markets and services. These same markets, 
however, simultaneously depended upon aggressive regulation at the noncompetitive 
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physical layer. In this respect, the history of the pre-Internet lends normative support 
not only for network neutrality rules in general, but for reclassification approaches 
specifically.  
The history of the FCC and the pre-Internet also illustrates the diverse toolkit of 
policy levers that the agency possesses to protect an open and competitive 
environment. Network neutrality rules—like the Computer II rules before them—are 
only one part of that toolkit. While network neutrality is both important and 
necessary, its dominance can obscure the importance—and availability—of these 
other tools. For instance, efforts to create competitive pressures (e.g., municipal 
broadband and Google Fiber) are particularly effective ways to increase speeds, fuel 
innovation, and expand deployment. In any event, the future of the open Internet will 
depend upon the FCC’s willingness to use a broad and interrelated set of policy levers 
to enforce its priorities regardless of the rules it ultimately adopts. 
 
 
